# Disinformation Neg-GDI22

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# NEG Case

## Russia

### Russian Disinfo Will Fail

#### The plan is not key - multiple reasons Russian disinfo will fail in the status quo

Tucker, New York University Jordan Center for Advanced Study of Russia, director, 22

[Joshua A, 4-12-22, Slate, "The People Who Believe Russia’s Disinformation", [https://slate.com/technology/2022/04/russia-disinformation-china-africa-latin-america.html accessed on 6-27-22](https://slate.com/technology/2022/04/russia-disinformation-china-africa-latin-america.html%20accessed%20on%206-27-2022) hooch//cs]

As the information war rages on, we’re left wondering what will happen next. Will Russia’s propaganda campaign continue to work on its citizens and others? Or will the lies fall apart, as they did in the West? There’s no way to know for sure, but there are several reasons to hope the truth will ultimately win out. First, you can’t hide sanctions. Businesses are closing across Russia due to[sanctions against the country](https://news.vcu.edu/article/2022/03/impact-of-sanctions-on-russias-economy). There’s a shortage of goods, jobs have disappeared, and inflation is rising. For now, Russia is successfully blaming this on the U.S. and the West, a tried and true [propaganda strategy](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/703208). But many of these sanctions are likely to have larger impacts in the medium to long range term. As time passes and Russian citizens begin to feel the impact of these sanctions more, their incentive to continue to believe the party line may begin to wane.

Second, you can’t hide dead soldiers. Russian media [reported](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pro-kremlin-newspaper-reports-nearly-10-000-russian-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine-before-disavowing-its-story/ar-AAVnufX) that an estimated 10,000 Russian soldiers have already died in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, government officials denied this story and forced the paper to retract the story, claiming it had been [posted by hackers](https://www.businessinsider.com/pro-kremlin-tabloid-nearly-10000-russian-troops-killed-ukraine-2022-3?op=1). Even if that number wasn’t accurate, it’s clear the war is having a bloody impact. Those soldiers are people’s [sons, fathers, and brothers](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/06/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-casualties.html). As casualties continue, it will be harder and harder to ignore the fact that their country is fighting a war and is not just engaged in a “special military operation.” Whether Russians respond by doubling down in support for the war—“these soldiers shall not have died in vain”—or turning against the war, they will likely eventually come to be informed by the realities of battlefield casualties.

Finally, in the digital age, it is harder to hide the truth. We’ve already seen signs that Russia’s disinformation wall can be breached. Independent media are creating “mirror” sites to evade government restrictions. Demand for virtual private networks that allow citizens to circumvent bans on media and social media has increased. And many outlets have created channels on Telegram (a popular social media platform in Russia that is still operating in the country) to share news. It’s clear that, if people want to look beyond state TV and find out what’s really happening, some, if not many, can. While we often focus on the supply disinformation, it is important not to lose sight of the demand for true information as a crucial component of information wars. The Soviet Union collapsed in part because its population stopped believing the regime’s version of reality; in the digital era, the distance between demand for true information and the ability to actually acquire such information is bound to be shorter.

As Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman highlight in their recent book Spin Dictators, it is easier for autocrats to be genuinely popular than to rely on repression. While Putin has extended a great deal of effort taking control of the Russian information ecosystem, the irony here is that these same repressive steps make it more difficult to know what his population is actually thinking. The truth is out there—and the day is coming when Putin may no longer be able to tell what Russians know or when they know it

#### Ukraine proves that Russia is not even capable of spreading significant disinformation

Schogol, Task and Purpose senior pentagon reporter, 22

[Jeff, 5-11-2022, Task & Purpose, "Russia actually isn't as good at information warfare as everyone thought,", https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-propaganda-war-ukraine/, Accessed 7-7-2022, LASA-LR]

One reason why Russian information operations are flailing is “they don’t have a lot of material to work with,” said Marek Posard, an expert on disinformation with the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization.

“There’s only so much you can do when X number of your generals are being killed in theater,” Posard told Task & Purpose. (In this case, the Ukrainians claim to have killed 12 Russian general officers.)

The United States and other Western nations tend to do better at information warfare when they tell the truth, and right now the facts are not in Russia’s favor, because the invasion of Ukraine has revealed how the Russian military is not as professional as many thought it was.

“The military operations in Ukraine clearly are not going well for the Russians,” Posard said. “You can’t hide the fact that civilian casualties are high. You can’t hide the fact that the Russians are shelling targets that they should not be shelling. You can’t hide the fact that there are Russian soldiers lying dead and there’s tanks on the side of the road that have been blown up.”

Russia actually isn’t as good at information warfare as everyone thought

However, the Russians have often made mistakes and used flimsy claims as part of their propaganda efforts because their goal is to flood the airwaves with as much disinformation as possible, said Olga Lautman, an expert on Russia and Ukraine.

### Status Quo Solves

**National responses to Russian propaganda are effective and are trusted**

**Boot, Washington Post columnist & Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 22**

(Max, 2-10-2022, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why the U.S. Ramped Up Its Information War with Russia", https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-us-ramped-its-information-war-russia, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

For years, American officials have lamented that the United States fights with one arm tied behind its back when it comes to waging information war—i.e., the battle for “hearts and minds.” Adversaries including the self-declared Islamic State and the Kremlin are free to spread lies and conspiracy theories, while the U.S. government generally feels compelled to hew to the truth in its public pronouncements (even as it often tries to conceal scandalous misconduct). U.S. adversaries find it easy to beam propaganda into the United States—often under false pretenses via social media—but it is harder for independent information to penetrate into more tightly controlled media spaces in countries such as China, North Korea, and Russia.

Now, as the crisis over Ukraine escalates, the Joe Biden administration seems to have developed an effective technique for waging information war. Rather than allowing President Vladimir Putin’s government to freely disseminate ludicrous conspiracy theories about anti-Russia plots involving the West and Ukraine, the administration has chosen to fight back by releasing intelligence reports about Russia’s attempts to create a justification for an invasion of Ukraine.

On January 23, the British government, acting in cooperation with the United States, announced details of a purported Russian plot to install a pro-Moscow regime in Kyiv. It even went so far as to name a pro-Russia former member of the Ukrainian parliament as Putin’s preferred puppet.

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On February 3, the Biden administration released information about a Russian scheme to film a fake attack on Russian territory or on Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine to manufacture a justification for an invasion. The administration said Russia had already recruited people who would be involved in the fake attack. Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby said the plan was to result in “a very graphic propaganda video, which would include corpses and actors who would be depicting mourners and images of destroyed locations, as well as military equipment at the hands of Ukraine or the West, even to the point where some of this equipment would be made to look like it was Western-supplied.”

The United States has also released copious details about Russian troop movements on Ukraine’s border, along with assessments that a Russian invasion is likely. The administration has even shared information about reported dissension within the ranks of the Russian military over a possible attack on Ukraine.

A senior U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained the administration’s strategy to the Wall Street Journal: “We’ve seen [Russia] run false-flag operations and use the confusion to launch military action many times in recent history. Exposing these plots makes it that much harder for Russia to execute them.”

Journalists are naturally skeptical of the U.S. intelligence, given the U.S. government’s history making claims that did not pan out—most notoriously about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which was used to justify the U.S. invasion in 2003. But there is indeed a long history of Russia using so-called false-flag operations to justify aggression. In 1939, the Soviet Union shelled its own troops near its border with Finland to justify an invasion of that country. In 1968, KGB agents in what was then Czechoslovakia concocted threats against the Soviet Union and even claimed to have found a “Made in USA” arms cache to justify a Red Army crackdown on the Prague Spring reform movement.

In 1999, Russian intelligence operatives are believed to have bombed Russian apartment buildings to justify an invasion of Chechnya. And the Russian invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were both accompanied by copious disinformation, including the use of “little green men” (i.e., soldiers in green uniforms devoid of Russian army insignia) to disguise the role of Russian military forces. The Kremlin even blamed the CIA for shooting down a Malaysian airliner over Ukraine in 2014—an act actually carried out by Russia-backed separatists using a Russian air defense system.

**In the past, the United States was caught flat-footed by Russian information operations. Exposing Russian plots in real time appears to be an effective response,** even though doing so raises concerns about exposing the U.S. intelligence community’s “sources and methods,” and journalists question whether the U.S. government’s claims can be trusted.

At the very least, the U.S. reports throw sand into the gears of the Russian military machine and force the Russian government to wonder where Western intelligence agencies are getting their information, which could possibly lead to a search for traitors within its own ranks. The reports also neutralize Russian propaganda and allow the United States to try to control the narrative rather than ceding to Putin and his propagandists.

Given the growing importance of information operations in modern warfare, that is no small achievement. It has already paid off in considerable Western unity in the face of Russian threats to Ukraine. Whether the U.S. actions will deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, is still unclear.

#### Russia's key warfare method is getting beaten by pushback

**Seib, USC Annenberg School for Communication and Public Diplomacy Professor Emeritus, 22**

(Philip, 5-9-2022, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, "Why Russia Is Losing the Information War", https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/why-russia-losing-information-war/, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

Poor Vladimir Putin. Sitting at his long table himself, confronting failure. The Russian military machine, weighed down its antiquated hardware and obsolete tactics, can barely hold its own against Ukraine. The Russian economy is on life support. The archenemy, NATO, is poised to expand further, adding Finland and Sweden to its ranks. The Kremlin is not a happy place.

Putin’s information war is also not going well. Just a decade ago, things were very different. Russia had embraced information warfare as a low-risk tool to undermine adversaries. Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of Russia’s armed forces, wrote in 2013: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”

For the Kremlin, information warfare is a key facet of Russia’s version of public diplomacy. With little (if any) allegiance to truth, Russia’s messaging to global publics accentuates self-justification as it pursues dangerous adventurism.

In line with this, in 2014 Russia unleashed a flood of propaganda about its need to rescue the supposedly oppressed Russian minorities in eastern Ukraine, and followed with a de facto invasion. In 2016, Russia’s information efforts directed at the American electorate proved effective, as the Kremlin’s internet trolls helped put Donald Trump in the White House. These successes crowned years of Russian information skirmishing directed at the Baltic States and other former Soviet properties that Putin wanted to reclaim.

Given Russia’s apparent preeminence in information warfare, taking control of Ukraine seemed well within the Kremlin’s grasp. This year, as its troops massed along the Russia-Ukraine border, Russia’s information attacks were relentless, claiming that Ukraine was riddled with corruption, was run Nazis, and was not really a nation. Once again, with this messaging as a foundation, Russia rolled into Ukraine.

**Despite its past successes, Russia’s information strategy did not work this time. The reason, in a word: pushback.**

Resistance to past Russian information efforts was usually too little, too late. Especially in the United States in 2016, the breadth and effectiveness of the Russian campaign was not fully recognized until after the election, and little was done in timely fashion to respond to Kremlin influence.

In 2022 that has changed, and counterattacks against Russian information efforts have taken place on many fronts. Western journalists now recognize that they have a responsibility to address Russian lies with timely reporting, and to find ways to circumvent barriers to delivery of that reporting. Although the Russian government tries to keep its citizens from seeing unfriendly news content, the ever-expanding universe of information technology provides workarounds. For example, the Telegram messaging service offers channels that can be used Russians to peruse content from global news media. Also, millions of Russians work around censorship downloading a virtual private network (VPN) that allows them to access online information that is banned their government.

**Western governments’ information agencies are also assertively responding to Russia.** The United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) has undertaken a massive effort to create an information “ring around Russia” that delivers programming designed not only for Russians, but is also directed to publics in countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and other neighbors of Russia. Since the February invasion began, the agency has also introduced a new Ukrainian- and Russian-language satellite channel that reaches all of Ukraine and parts of Russia. While the Kremlin silences independent media voices within Russia, demand for content from abroad grows. During the first three weeks after Russia’s invasion, USAGM verified more than one billion video views of its Russian-language programs across social media platforms. The agency reports that interviews with grieving Russian mothers whose sons were killed in combat are among the most widely viewed.

#### Squo solves - having multinational, independent media sources cover the Ukraine conflict solves any risk of Russian disinformation

Schogol, Task and Purpose senior pentagon reporter, 22

[Jeff, 5-11-2022, Task & Purpose, "Russia actually isn't as good at information warfare as everyone thought,", https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-propaganda-war-ukraine/, Accessed 7-7-2022, LASA-LR]

“It is not meant to direct you in any which way,” Lautman said. “It is not meant for a critical thinker. It is more meant to pollute the information space with so much disinformation that the person can’t get to the truth.”

Separately, the Russians also launch very targeted propaganda campaigns against specific people or on certain issues, and those efforts tend to be more thought out, she said. For example, the Russians are currently putting a lot of time and effort into claims that the Ukrainian government is kidnapping journalists to silence them.

Since Russia attacked Ukraine in late February, though, its information operations have been weaker than in the past because foreign media have been on the ground to discredit Russian propaganda, Lautman said. The New York Times recently exposed Russia’s lies about the massacre of Ukrainian civilians in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha.

As long as the media coverage continues, Russia’s propaganda campaign will remain weak, Lautman said. “When it wanes, then you will see Russia’s disinformation operations being a lot more successful because they’ll be able to get their message across,” she said.

### Turn – Label Hides Russian Actions

#### All of Russian hybrid warfare is dangerous but Western countries underestimate Russian aggression as just "propaganda campaigns"

**Żaryn, Chancellery of Poland’s Prime Minister National Security Department Head, 19**

(Stanisław, 8-9-19, Defense News, "Russia’s hybrid warfare toolkit has more to offer than propaganda", https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/08/09/russias-hybrid-warfare-toolkit-has-more-to-offer-than-propaganda/, accessed on 7-2-2022, SR)

In February 2018, the small town of Uzhhorod in southwestern Ukraine bore witness to unusual events. To be more specific, there was an attempt to set fire to the office of the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association.

The alleged perpetrators had arrived to the town with one goal in mind: to destroy, record their action and vanish into thin air. The plan worked, despite some problems early on. As it turned out, the arson attack was not necessarily an act of vandalism. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that it could be a part of a complex hostile influence operation fitting in the modus operandi that Russian special services employ in their activities against the West.

In the aftermath of the Uzhhorod arson attack, a part of Hungarian infrastructure was damaged, the Ukrainian state was ridiculed and its capability to guarantee security was questioned. And all this happened in the middle of a harsh dispute Kiev and Budapest had been involved in for months over the right of minorities living in Ukraine, to use their language.

Additionally, the attack was meant to undermine relations Poland maintains with Ukraine and Hungary, as direct executors of the plan turned out to be Polish citizens.

This incident deserves a thorough analysis because it shows that Russian “hybrid activities” against NATO go well beyond spreading fake news or pushing manipulated narratives. The Russian hybrid warfare toolkit has more to offer, including aggressive activities or even inflicting physical harm.

Western countries have been waking up to the aggressive methods Russia uses against NATO members. Unfortunately, many people still have a limited understanding of what the term “Russian activities” really means. Their first thought would be “propaganda campaigns” or “spreading lies and disinformation through the media.” And they could not be more wrong. **Such simplification is a huge mistake, potentially leading to the underestimation of a really serious threat.**

In fact, apart from information activities per se, Russia carries out so-called hostile influence campaigns. These consume more resources and require the use of a multitude of methods. Main tasks are performed by Russian special services which — given the realities in Russia — are able to force any institution in the country to push its agenda. They carry out intelligence work, and “intelligence work” Russian-style quite often translates to “launching kinetic operations.” These aggressive measures can be used as part of hostile influence.

The Uzhhorod incident of 2018 prompted a response from Polish authorities. Poland’s domestic counterintelligence agency, ABW, soon identified the alleged perpetrators and the mastermind behind the attack. Their trial in a Polish court is pending.

As testified by the accused and found by the ABW, the arson attack had been meticulously planned. The group had communicated via encrypted messaging apps, they had used mobile phones purchased exclusively for the needs of that action and they had traveled in such a way so as to lose potential tails. During all that time they had been in touch with the brains behind the attack who had evaluated their every step, as well as the final effect.

The statements made by the accused and the findings of facts provide enough evidence to conclude that what happened in Uzhhorod was a well-planned operation intended to cause an international political sabotage. Presumably, it was carried out for propaganda purposes on the one hand, and for political ones on the other.

The trial also revealed the international background of the case. Michał P. (full name withheld under Polish privacy laws), a Pole in charge of recruiting the thugs for the attack and the “big fish” on the Polish side, stated that the order to engage in Ukraine had come from Germany. More specifically, Michał P. named a German journalist with ties to Germany’s far-right party, AfD, as the mastermind behind the operation. The journalist was supposed to have shared the plan of the attack with Michał P. The plan’s main points involved setting fire to the building of the Hungarian center in Uzhhorod and painting fascist symbols on its walls. So the version of events presented by Polish suspects — subject to initial verification within the investigation — indicates that the order to escalate tensions between Poland, Ukraine and Hungary may have originated from a German political party often accused of being pro-Russian.

The wicked plan had landed on fertile soil in Poland. The Polish trio engaged in the provocation turned out to sympathize with marginal or even almost nonexistent yet extremist groups active in the country. In fact, Michał P. himself used to have ties to the Zmiana (Change) party whose then-leader, Mateusz P. (again, full name withheld), has been awaiting trial for espionage and collaboration with Russian and Chinese intelligence services. The remaining two Poles belong to a far-right organization believed to be vulnerable to Russian influence and often exploited to undermine Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The Uzhhorod arson attack should raise the question about the extent of Russian influence in Western European countries. In fact, there are groups supporting the actions Russia undertakes against the Central and Eastern European countries, their sovereignty, and relations between Brussels and Washington. Members of such groups act in a way that is congruent with the Kremlin’s political aims. These include the polarization of political sentiment in particular countries, preventing them from entering into a close cooperation in areas the Kremlin deems as strategic, and impeding regional consolidation. Oftentimes, the said groups receive funding from Russia. The ultimate goal of its activities is to fuel tensions between particular countries (both locally and centrally) and, consequently, to undermine their bilateral and multilateral relations as well as make particular Central and Eastern European countries lean toward Russia.

The case presented herein is just the tip of an iceberg. However, it is an important tip, as **it clearly shows that with the politics of Russia come real-life threats that go far beyond mere disinformation Western countries are so willing to point at**. The Uzhhorod operation originated from a third country; it was well-planned and designed with the intention to spark political quarrels between at least three states; an exemplary kinetic operation in support of the Kremlin’s interests in Central and Eastern Europe.

In recent years, Moscow has become more and more brutal in subordinating the countries of the region to its political and business goals. It has been using as proxies those groups that for different reasons would be eager to help push its agenda against the West. We must be aware of the nature and methods of the Kremlin’s actions. **Narrowing down Russia’s hostile activity to spreading lies in the media is a losing battle.**

### AT – Russian Escalation Risk

#### Risk of escalation overblown – Russia only uses nukes as a scare tactic and won’t follow through

Raine, International Institute for Strategic Studies Geopolitical Due Diligence Senior advisor, 22

[John Raine, 3-11-22, International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Time for NATO to find a way out of the escalation trap in Ukraine,", https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/03/time-for-nato-to-find-a-way-out-of-the-escalation-trap-in-ukraine, Accessed 7-11-22, LASA-LR]

At root, the fear is that any conflict with Russia could escalate ultimately to the use of nuclear weapons. This is technically correct in that both sides possess nuclear weapons, but NATO’s fear of a nuclear exchange as the inevitable or even likely ‘terminus ad quem’ has been ruthlessly leveraged by Putin. He has used it to create a very large space in which he can wage conventional war in Europe without a military response from NATO. Theories of escalation assume conventional warfare sits on the same continuum as nuclear, that is to say that the decision to use a nuclear weapon will flow directly from the earlier decisions to escalate. It is, however, of an entirely separate nature.

The US and Russia have form on nuclear de-escalation, both in the graphic instance of Cuba and over time through treaty-based arms-limitation measures. Moving to a nuclear exchange would be a monumental step for either side. It fits neither Putin’s plan to restore the Russian dominion as his legacy, nor the West’s to contain him, nor both sides’ desire to survive. The evidence is not that he wants to pull the knife of a nuclear exchange, but that he wants to use the threat of it, occasionally even letting us see the blade of his knife, to give him the freedom to pummel his adversaries with his fists.

## Info Credibility

### Status Quo Solves

#### Status quo solves now: governments and social media platforms are actively combating disinformation

**Jeangene Vilmer, Institute for Strategic Researcher French Ministry for Armed Forces et al., 18** [Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer, Alexandre Escorcia, Marine Guillaume, and Janaina Herrera, and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Washington DC. He is also an Adjunct Professor at the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) and an Honorary Ancien of NATO Defense College., Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the North Atlantic Council (NATO), 8-X-2018, 2022, Policy Planning Staff (CAPS, ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Ministry for the Armed Forces), "INFORMATION MANIPULATION A Challenge for Our Democracies", <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf>, accessed on 7-8-2022, MG]

Online platforms have developed a significant array of mechanisms against information manipulation, in response to—and hence in accordance with—the criticisms they face. The intensification of these critiques has compelled platforms to put forward a great number of measures within a very short time span, without always having previously articulated a genuine response strategy. In this respect, the various proposed measures do not always have the same goal (provide targeted or more structural responses), or the same temporality (preventive or ad hoc action), the same scale (measures applying to just one country or to all users). They can nevertheless be categorized along the six following criteria:

A significant proportion of those measures aim at fostering Internet users’ awareness of the processes by which information is exchanged, disseminated and hierarchized on online platforms: for example, Facebook has published user guides outlining good practices to deal with information circulating on social networks; Google has intensified its didactic efforts to explain the criteria underpinning the sequencing of information by search engines. These awareness-raising strategies are not confined to prevention: online platforms have also decided to alert their users who were exposed to false information. This was notably the case with Facebook, which announced they had sent a warning message to those users whose data had been collected by Cambridge Analytica during the U.S. presidential election (so far amounting to 87 million users). For each of these examples, the stated goal is to give internet users “the tools” that will enable them to identify and respond to information manipulation themselves.

Moreover, a number of platforms—including Facebook—have reached out directly to various candidates in the presidential election so as to make them aware of the risks and encourage them to develop good internet practices. More broadly, online platforms have also strengthened the protection of data privacy, for it appears that information manipulation campaigns are often based on the exploitation of personal data—either by stealing it or by tailoring it to their narratives. Thus Facebook has significantly improved the interface that allows its users to control the visibility of their personal data (in particular through a centralization of all settings). The platforms are also more active in protecting their users against the risk of data piracy: in early May 2018, faced with a leak which risked exposing its users’ passwords, Twitter demonstrated its responsiveness by immediately asking users to change their passwords.

Finally, through public hearings, large online platforms contribute to raising public awareness of the need for increased vigilance against information manipulation.

Information manipulation campaigns often rely on automated accounts (bots), networks of automated accounts (netbots) and anonymous accounts. Whereas platforms used to be reluctant to identify and deactivate the latter—for a number of reasons (economic model, editorial neutrality)—they have recently shifted their approach. They started by taking a closer look at their users’ accounts so as to suspend accounts that were fake, automated, and/or suspected of participation in an information manipulation campaign. Twitter announced that it had suspended over 50,000 accounts “connected to Russian interference,” to quote the company’s spokesperson. However it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these account suspension campaigns. They very often do not confine themselves to targeting accounts that are likely to participate in information manipulation campaigns: they mostly suspend fake accounts sold by reputation management companies whose aim is to boost their clients’ visibility. In late 2014, Instagram thus launched an operation to purge 300 million accounts (#PurgeInstagram), which had significant repercussions for the visibility of American stars’ accounts (Kim Kardashian, Katy Perry, Oprah Winfrey, Justin Bieber and Rihanna). Facebook had adopted a similar approach in 2012, by launching a large hunt against fake “likes,” though with only limited success. Since 2016, the fight against “the fake” has become the object of a war of figures, the effectiveness of which is difficult to assess. At the end of the first quarter of 2018, Facebook claimed to have suspended 583 million fake accounts and about 1.3 billion over six months.

In cooperation with the US government, Facebook, Twitter and Google have also set up an initiative aimed at creating a common database listing fake accounts and the strategies developed by trolls to escape identification. The goal is to optimize information manipulation detection by exchanging information on the models and actors behind it. Other measures, relying on artificial intelligence, have been implemented to detect and suspend these accounts, sometimes even before they are activated. Twitter thus prohibited the use of multiple accounts simultaneously (a method very often adopted by trolls). Along the same lines, Facebook also announced that they had developed a tool enabling them to detect the serial publication of similar messages and comments. All of these techniques are routinely used by manipulation campaigns

Online platforms have developed several measures to speed up the removal of malicious content. While techniques based on artificial intelligence are used as preventive measures (before the content is published online), platforms continue to rely on human involvement to monitor—and sometimes erase—exchanged content and dubious advertising. In December 2017, Facebook announced that they had recruited an additional 1,000 staff members to check advertising and remove it whenever it did not meet acceptable standards (i.e. when they target people according to their political, religious, ethnic or social affiliation). Facebook has also increased the teams dedicated to verifying dubious content by over 60%, with a total staff of 8,000 people globally. While this reinforcement of human involvement is significant, it must be noted that it primarily concerns the monitoring of content deemed illegal and/or related to terrorism. In July 2018, however, Facebook announced the implementation of a “new policy” of deleting content susceptible of causing violence, starting first with countries where disinformation has triggered violence,78 such as Sri Lanka, for example, where messages claiming that Muslims were poisoning Buddhist food were erased from social networks.

Twitter also sped up the cleaning process, through the introduction in May-June 2018 of new mesures to combat trolling and hateful and extremist comments,79 and the suspension of at least 70 million accounts in only two months—twice as high as the suspension rate in October 2017. 80 Platforms have also enhanced reporting mechanisms: procedures allowing internet users to report dubious posts have been simplified. Google has recently introduced tools enabling its users to report “misleading and false” content. Facebook now grants greater attention to the feedback and comments of web users who have identified fake information. More broadly, Facebook seeks to standardize its response to information manipulation through the development of an analytical framework that they call “Problems, Surfaces and Actions.” The goal of this framework is to objectify response thresholds (when and how to respond), coordinate the work of various teams and enforce a standard response procedure. The latter includes, in particular, recommending fact-checking articles (which deal with the same facts as the dubious content posted online and enable users to take a step back from the fake information); notifying the number of other users who deemed the information to be false or misleading; and an alert that the user is likely to relay false information. In the same vein, YouTube chose to display, next to some conspiracy videos, a link to a Wikipedia article directly challenging the conspiracy narrative.

Finally, online platforms also developed tools to detect the “deep fake,” i.e. fake news that can very convincingly reproduce the effects of reality. Google has announced that it has created a tool capable of detecting such videos (in particular those that can make public figures talk) and of removing such content before it is posted online.

For a number of reasons (cultural, economic, technical), online platforms are wary of regulation. They tend to favor informal cooperation with public authorities and the media. Facebook thus collaborates on a regular basis with traditional media outlets so as to exchange records listing those articles circulating on its website which were flagged as fake news. Google reported having done the same during the American and French presidential campaigns. The two platforms also ran several initiatives in close cooperation with civil society and the media to counter information manipulation (see above).

Facebook also declared that it had collaborated directly with the German government during the most recent general elections. The terms of that partnership were directly dictated by German legislation regulating social networks, which—among other things—makes it compulsory for these online networks to remove any blatantly illegal content, and in particular hate speech and discrimination, within a very short time span (between 24 hours and 7 days in contentious cases). Other countries are also considering implementing legislative mechanisms that would oblige platforms to act more decisively against contentious content.

Platforms very often choose to promote constructive approaches to counter information manipulation. A policy favored by many of them consists in reinforcing the visibility of reliable content and/or those produced by trustworthy media sources in their search engines and news feeds. This entails, in particular, updating ranking algorithms as well as blocking websites that do not display their country of origin. It also implies proactive action to detect the most common sources of disinformation (conspiracy sites, sites masquerading as institution websites and relaying false information) so as to reduce their visibility (without necessarily removing them).

YouTube, Google and Facebook also put in place the “Trust Project Initiative,” in partnership with Santa Clara University, whose objective is to promote reliable content by enabling those who produce it to share information on the fact-checking procedures they implement, the history of the media outlets for which they work, as well as the structure and identity of its management and shareholders. These various elements of information, which appear as tabs, seek to highlight the ethical standards and the trustworthiness of these various media sources.

Finally, digital platforms also promote the creation of spaces for “constructive” debate: Twitter has undertaken to develop, for example, indicators that make it possible to monitor the diversity of exchanged opinion(s), the receptivity of users and media awareness of the issue. As for the Snapchat application, which is very popular with younger demographics, it has opted to divide its content into two categories: “Discover” and “Social.” This division enables Snapchat to indirectly promote institutional media, which are the only media sources that appear in the “Discover” section (other types of content that present themselves as information—blog posts, comments, shared posts and articles—are confined to the “Social” interface).

In the face of stark criticism for their naivety and lack of discernment towards the impact and the scale of information manipulation campaigns, the platforms have emphasized their need to better understand the phenomenon. To achieve this, they have put in place various partnerships and exchange policies with the world of research. Facebook has, for example, recently agreed to share some of its data with Stanford University, enabling the latter to study information manipulation campaigns, notably through its “Project on Democracy and the Internet.”

Likewise, the platforms contribute to the funding of initiatives aimed at developing a better awareness of ethical issues linked to platform usage, including in the field of information. This is, for example, what Google sought to do by creating “DeepMind Ethics & Society”.

While the social platforms have come to grips with the fight against information manipulation, there remains a lot of work to be done. As The Wall Street Journal recalls, Twitter CEO himself, Jack Dorsey, shared at least 17 tweets from a Russian troll between late 2016 and mid-2017.81

### Impact Takeouts

#### Impacts of disinformation are overblown

**Lim, Harvard Kennedy School's Shorenstein Center Technology and Social Change Research Project Researcher, 20**

(Gabrielle, 8-7-2020, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation ", https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation/, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

In recent years, concerns over foreign interference from “bad actors” have increased, and in the wake of the 2016 US presidential election, governments around the world, social media companies and civil society alike have been on the lookout for such attempts to degrade the integrity of our elections or, more vaguely, to “sow discord.” From pseudonymous trolls and botnets to outrage-inducing, hyper-partisan content, it seems that week after week, there is news that online accounts are pushing narratives in the interest of Russia, Iran or China. The Global Engagement Center (GEC), a division of the US State Department, for example, has alleged that Russia is operating an “ecosystem” of humans and bots to amplify conspiracy theories related to COVID-19 in a bid to “sow discord and undermine U.S. institutions and alliances.” Senator Elizabeth Warren even released a detailed plan to fight disinformation as part of her presidential campaign, citing “foreign actors” as the main threat. Scholars and journalists are also on the hunt. Indeed, plenty of ink has been spilled on the ills of “weaponized social media” and the next generation of “active measures.”

**However, despite all the fears of mass-targeted influence operations from foreign adversaries, it remains unclear whether they have much impact at all.**

Evidence and analysis of activity from the Russian-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) continue to be debated. Although some suggest that it was plausible the IRA influenced public opinion, there is very little evidence of direct impact on the US 2016 presidential election. The bulk of their activity was engaged in audience building, and when compared to the massive volumes of media consumed by the average American across mainstream, independent and social media, Russian-sponsored activities would have been but a drop in an otherwise chaotic and constantly churning sea of information. Attempts by China to influence the Taiwanese election were likewise ineffective, as incumbent and pro-democracy leader Tsai Ing-wen won a second term by a wide margin. Reporting on such influence operations, however, is often couched in wording that implies attribution and effect without actual verification or convincing evidence.

Of course, the threat of influence operations should not be taken lightly and warrants investigation and thoughtful study. Yet, the knee-jerk reactions to foreign influence campaigns from some policy makers and parts of civil society have exaggerated the impact, and therefore the threat, of foreign-targeted influence operations. And, in an ironic twist, our fears and concerns that foreign actors are somehow interfering with democracy and deliberative discourse are, counterintuitively, allowing for the further erosion of democracy and deliberative discourse.

#### Disinformation is subject to diminishing returns

Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, and Ertan, Boğaziçi University, Department of International Trade Assistant Professor, 22

(Akin Unver, Ozyegin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, Arhan S. Ertan, Bogazici University, Department of International Trade Assistant Professor, Social Science Research Network, 5-2-2022, "The Strategic Logic of Digital Disinformation: Offense, Defence and Deterrence in Information Warfare," p.7, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4098988, accessed 7-5-2022) SS:/

Contrary to classical forms of communicative disruption – such as traditional media propaganda – digital disinformation has a shorter strategic utility span, but has a wider and faster reach.30 Digital disinformation attempts can spread across a global audience within a matter of minutes and potentially alter short-term beliefs about key events, but is always subject to debunking and fact-checking after its immediate benefits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional propaganda, digital disinformation often focuses more on weakening the adversary’s narrative and framing of events rather than strengthening own side and it is this uniquely disruptive focus of digital disinformation that separates its strategic utility from that of classical propaganda efforts.31

Yet, the Attacker’s advantage in disinformation is generally short-lived. Following its immediate effect on demobilizing, demoralizing and debilitating Defender’s efforts, the Attacker gets debunked and the fact-checked version of its narrative spreads equally fast across ICTs and social media. This debunking generates a form of ‘reputational penalty’ for the Attacker, who gets ‘named and shamed’ in international platforms and suffers from an additional, secondary ‘suspicion penalty’ on its successive communication efforts.32 An Attacker that overuses disinformation suffers these reputational and suspicion penalties at an increasing rate, causing its factually correct public diplomacy and government communication efforts to be met with low interest and resistance, and being accused of crying wolf. In turn, each utilization of disinformation by an Attacker as a foreign policy tool, reduces the effectiveness of its successive communication efforts – disinformation and otherwise – lowering the net utility the Attacker gets from communicative manipulation at each successive turn. In simple terms, disinformation as a foreign policy tool has diminishing returns, whereby its overproduction results in increasing penalties in successive rounds of an iterative multi-stage game.

### Alternate Cause – Internal Disinformation

#### No solvency – disinformation internal to Alliance undermines the plan – it camouflages enemy disinformation

Rebegea, Center for European Policy Analysis Democratic Resilience Director & Schmiedl, Center for European Policy Analysis Senior Program Officer, 21

[Corina & Carsten, In 2020, Schmiedl served as Advisor to the U.S. representative and co-chair of the NATO Reflection Group, 2022, NATO 2030 Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, “Chapter 13 War by Other Means: Securing NATO Against Disinformation in the Coming Decade”, edited by Jason Blessing, Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, “Chapter 13 War by Other Means: Securing NATO Against Disinformation in the Coming Decade”, <https://www.sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/nato-2030-towards-new-strategic-concept-and-beyond>, p. 299- accessed 6-22-22, AFB]

An increasing risk for the transatlantic Alliance also comes from within. Political actors in democracies are imitating and employing tactics widely utilized by foreign malign actors. Disinformation thus becomes not only a weapon against their own populations, but it creates the perfect camouflage for foreign actors to abscond their operations and further their goals. The landscape of disinformation is changing from identifiable external enemies to blurred boundaries between foreign, state, non-state, and domestic actors, making attribution and response increasingly more difficult.

### No Solvency – Debunking Fails

#### No Solvency – Debunking is not effective against sophisticated attacks or attackers with an alternate risk calculus.

Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, and Ertan, Boğaziçi University, Department of International Trade Assistant Professor, 22

(Akin Unver, Ozyegin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, Arhan S. Ertan, Bogazici University, Department of International Trade Assistant Professor, Social Science Research Network, 5-2-2022, "The Strategic Logic of Digital Disinformation: Offense, Defence and Deterrence in Information Warfare," p. 9-10, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4098988, accessed 7-5-2022) SS:/

Finally, Attackers often play down the reputational costs of initiating a disinformation campaign and overestimate their short-term net utility compared to their medium- and long-term reputational costs originating from this action. Attackers may view short-term payoffs from initiating a disinformation campaign (by distracting and demobilizing the Defender) more preferable compared to any obscure reputational and suspicion penalties later on – or believe that the Defender cannot debunk the claim. Indeed, the Defender may not always successfully debunk a disinformation claim, especially when the volume of disinformation is too high (such as a botnet campaign), or the disinformation is built in a sophisticated, hard-to-debunk fashion. If the Attacker believes that its disinformation campaign is sophisticated enough that it will be difficult to fact-check its claims, it will pursue disinformation believing that it will not suffer from reputational or suspicion penalties later on. Similarly, even if the Defender successfully debunks a claim, it may not be able to disseminate its fact-checked response widely or in time. Indeed, this was the core claim of Vosoughi, Roy and Aral’s (2018) seminal work: in politically charged environments, false news spread faster and wider than accurate news across social media platforms.35 Similarly, Saling et. al. (2021) finds that even users that regularly fact-check news online can still share disinformation inadvertently if the event is emotional and momentous enough.36 To that end, in some cases, the Defender may debunk successfully, but it may fail to disseminate true claims sufficiently and as a result, may fail to generate international public reaction against the Attacker and fall short of ‘naming and shaming’ the Attacker.37

Therefore, an Attacker may find initiating a disinformation campaign preferable, if:  
a. it has a different calculus about reputational and suspicion costs of the interaction compared to the Defender and the international audience (IA),  
b. it believes the Defender will not be able to ‘name and shame’ – or at least on time,  
c. it believes the Defender will not be able to successfully debunk and disseminate the claims,  
d. if will not suffer from significant reputational or suspicion costs beyond the short-term, or if both costs are not significant enough in comparison to its short-term payoff.

### Alt Cause – NATO Divisions

#### Alt causes - Disinformation tampers threat perceptions by creating attribution problems but NATO divisions better explain the apathetic response in Ukraine.

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(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 2, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

The foreign policy use of such terms predates the 2016 US elections and proliferated after the Russian military involvement in Crimea and Donbas.9 The primary reason for this contextual proliferation was the Russian decision to deny the initial stages of both its involvement in Ukraine and its broader strategy of distracting and dividing Western attention over Russian military operations.10 There is still a debate over whether it was really Russian information operations that had derailed NATO’s response in Ukraine, or if disinformation discourses are employed in order to shift the blame over to Russia for the time when NATO was already divided over its commitment to Ukraine.11 While there is robust evidence of Russian information operations in Ukraine and their role in spreading disinformation in NATO countries, NATO’s sustained apathy towards the rising Russian military influence in the Black Sea after 2014 and in Syria after 2015 support the latter claim.

### Alt Cause – Social Media

#### No Solvency – Social Media algorithms are opaque to researchers and can’t be moderated by traditional mechanisms.

Mckay and Tenove, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver; Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate and Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 20

(Spencer Mckay, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate, Chris Tenove, Chris Tenove, University of British Columbia Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow. SAGE Journals, 7-4-2020, "Disinformation as a Threat to Deliberative Democracy," Political Research Quarterly 2021, Vol. 74. No. 3, p. 705, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1065912920938143, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

Social media platforms disrupted the preexisting institutions and practices that amplified or filtered out claims in media systems. In particular, they have partially displaced journalists as gatekeepers (Graves and Anderson 2020). This development is not entirely negative, because journalistic news selection often excludes diverse perspectives and caters to holders of political or economic power, among other defects. However, social media are not neutral “intermediaries” (Chadwick 2017; Gillespie 2018), and they shape the genres, speed, curation, and dissemination patterns of communication in new and often problematic ways.

One major change is the role of algorithms. For instance, platform algorithms determine the discoverability of content via search engines, set the order of messages in newsfeeds, and provide changing and often micro-targeted lists of “trending topics” to users. Algorithmic curation is opaque: most users do not understand how their individual information feeds are moderated, and independent researchers do not have the data needed to understand dissemination patterns. To serve social media company business models, this “black box moderation” uses “engagement-optimizing algorithms that prioritize enticing content—even if from a source peddling clickbait or political outrage, or promoted by bots, trolls, or . . . agents using false identities” (Kornbluh, Goodman, and Weiner 2020, 8).

There is long-standing concern that social media produce “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles” (Pariser 2011), such that selective exposure to information in like-minded communities increases political polarization and decreases acceptance of shared facts. Evidence suggests that relatively few citizens are confined to these echo chambers (Dubois and Blank 2018; Nelson and Webster 2017), but social media do appear to facilitate the circulation of messages that provoke strong emotions or signal identity affiliations (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018; Wardle and Derakhshan 2017). For instance, online partisan news articles stoke anger that can encourage users to share material that is polarizing or generates hostility (Hasell and Weeks 2016). It appears that the exposure to and promotion of false claims are mediated by factors, including political partisanship, political interest, media literacy, age, and certain psychological traits (Bail et al. 2020; Dubois and Blank 2018; Grinberg et al. 2019). In the United States, these effects appear to be politically asymmetric, as more right-wing social media users appear to consume and share false news at higher levels (Grinberg et al. 2019; Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler 2018).

Disinformation campaigns exploit these elements of social media design to push disinformation from relatively fringe sites into much broader circulation. In particular, provocative content may generate viral dissemination on social media or may provoke reporting by mainstream news outlets (Phillips 2018; Vargo, Guo, and Amazeen 2018). This strategy is referred to as “the propaganda pipeline” by Benkler, Faris, and Roberts (2018). The social media accounts of Russian-backed operatives often used social media accounts to amplify divisive alt-right messaging that would be picked up by a receptive rightwing media ecosystem in the United States which includes right-wing talk radio outlets and Fox News (Benkler, Faris, and Roberts 2018; Marwick and Lewis 2017).

#### No Solvency - Social media wield broad influence and is difficult to regulate at the global level.

Mckay and Tenove, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver; Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate and Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 20

(Spencer Mckay, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate, Chris Tenove, Chris Tenove, University of British Columbia Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow. SAGE Journals, 7-4-2020, "Disinformation as a Threat to Deliberative Democracy," Political Research Quarterly 2021, Vol. 74. No. 3, p. 706, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1065912920938143, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

First, social media companies have long downplayed their role as media companies to avoid attendant regulations (Gillespie 2018). While social media undoubtedly have different patterns of use and editorial control than other types of mass media, they clearly wield social and political power that requires oversight. Second, the influence that social media platforms have on mass communication and political opinion has been opaque, which has limited demands for public justification. Their means of influence—including algorithmic boosting and targeted messaging that is invisible to other users—are hard to detect, particularly because the companies themselves have long avoided transparency (Gillespie 2018; Kornbluh, Goodman, and Weiner 2020). Third, social media platforms structure user interaction at a global level, according to policies and design choices that are primarily made in company headquarters in a single country (predominately the United States). To a large extent, regulation and oversight have been limited to the country where these headquarters are based. Governments and experts have proposed increased regulation of social media platforms to address disinformation and other forms of “online harms” (United Kingdom Parliament 2019; see also European Commission 2018). As we will argue, a deliberative systems analysis can help identify policies to reduce harms that disinformation poses to democratic debate, while addressing concerns about undemocratic controls on speech and violations of rights to free expression.

#### No Solvency – Russian Disinformation campaigns exploit low cost vulnerabilities in Social Media.

Mckay and Tenove, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver; Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate and Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 20

(Spencer Mckay, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate, Chris Tenove, Chris Tenove, University of British Columbia Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow. SAGE Journals, 7-4-2020, "Disinformation as a Threat to Deliberative Democracy," Political Research Quarterly 2021, Vol. 74. No. 3, p. 707-708, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1065912920938143, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

This online campaign shares many qualities with decades of information operations by the Russian government, mounted against domestic and foreign populations (Paul and Matthews 2016; U.S. Senate 2019, 11–14). Russian dezinformatsiya tactics include the propagation of false or misleading information in the news media, and the creation or funding of domestic front groups to advance Russian aims, with the goals of “widening existing rifts; stoking existing tensions; and destabilizing other states’ relations with their publics and one another” (Jack 2017, 9). Perhaps the most notable development is that this and other online disinformation campaigns are “participatory in nature. Their messages spread through— and with the help of—online crowds and other information providers” (Starbird, Arif, and Wilson 2019, emphasis in original). That is, online disinformation campaigns achieve a sense of ubiquity and scale at relatively low cost by exploiting vulnerabilities in the structure of the social media platforms that mediate interactions between citizens.

## Democracy

### No Internal Link – Disinformation

#### No internal link – disinformation is completely overblown and does not significantly affect democracy in any way.

Ingram, Columbia Journalism Review Chief Technology Writer, 19

[Mathew, 2-7-2019, Columbia Journalism Review, "Researchers say fears about ‘fake news’ are exaggerated,", https://www.cjr.org/the\_media\_today/researchers-fake-news-exaggerated.php, Accessed 7-7-2022, LASA-LR]

A fake problem: In an article he wrote for CJR in 2017, Jacob Nelson, a professor at the Arizona State University’s journalism school, argued that fake news was “a fake problem.” Evidence gathered from online analytics tools like comScore, he said, showed that “the audience for fake news is real, but it’s also really small.”

A crazy idea: In an infamous quote not long after the 2016 election, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg scoffed at the idea that fake news could have influenced the outcome. “I think the idea that fake news on Facebook—which is a very small amount of the content—influenced the election in any way [is] a pretty crazy idea,” he said. He later said he regretted downplaying the effect of fake news.

Blame the media: In a study published in late 2017, Duncan Watts and David Rothschild from Microsoft Research argued that the amount and reach of misinformation was unlikely to have had any noticeable impact on the election, and that instead of blaming fake news, we should “blame the mainstream media.”

Blame the media 2: A group of researchers from Harvard and MIT argued in a paper looking at the election results that the problem was a right-wing media ecosystem anchored around Breitbart News that “used social media as a backbone to transmit a hyper-partisan perspective to the world.”

### No Effect on Democracy

#### The plan solves for nothing, the scope and magnitude of disinformation is simply too small and nuanced to even have an effect on democracies.

Ingram, Columbia Journalism Review Chief Technology Writer, 19

[Mathew, 2-7-2019, Columbia Journalism Review, "Researchers say fears about ‘fake news’ are exaggerated,", https://www.cjr.org/the\_media\_today/researchers-fake-news-exaggerated.php, Accessed 7-7-2022, LASA-LR]

Nyhan says his data shows so-called “fake news” reached only a tiny proportion of the population before and during the 2016 election. In most cases, misinformation from a range of fake news sites made up just 2 percent or less of the average person’s online news consumption, and even among the group of older conservatives who were most likely to consume fake news, it only made up about 8 percent. Not only that, but the University of Michigan researcher says a new paper he and his colleagues recently published shows the reach of fake news actually fell significantly between the 2016 election and the midterm elections last year, which suggests Facebook has cracked down on the problem. Nyhan also says “no credible evidence exists that exposure to fake news changed the outcome of the 2016 election.”

This might come as a surprise to Kathleen Hall Jamieson. She’s a veteran public policy researcher who published a book last year entitled Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President. Jamieson, whose colleagues call her “the Drill Sergeant” for her no-nonsense attitude, has more 40 years of studying human behavior under her belt. In the book, she says the evidence suggests misinformation propagated by Russian trolls likely influenced the outcome of the election, in part because of the number of “swing” or undecided voters who were susceptible to those kinds of tactics. Jamieson also notes that the traditional news media played a key role in spreading this fake news and propaganda, by writing innumerable articles about Hillary Clinton’s emails. And she argues fake news wouldn’t have had to make much of an impact to influence the election, since a fairly small number of votes gave Trump the electoral college wins he needed.

Nyhan and his fellow researchers, however, including Princeton political scientist Andrew Guess, say their study looked at the actual behavior of a large sample of users who consented to have their online activity tracked and recorded in real time, and then followed up with interviews about their perceptions of the content. Not only was the amount of actual fake news they encountered incredibly tiny, Guess told CJR this past fall, but the idea that this would influence their behavior is also a bit of a stretch (something Nyhan wrote about for The New York Times last year). “It’s predominantly people who are inclined to believe the conclusions that are being made in this content, not so much swaying them to believe something,” Guess said. “In other words, it’s more or less just confirmation bias.”

### AT: Polarization

#### Polarisation isn’t dangerous and can create social change

**Pausch, Salzburg University applied Science Political Scientist, 21** [Markus Pausch, 10-10-2021, accessed on 7-8-2022, European Journal of Futures Research, "The future of polarisation in Europe: relative cosmopolitanism and democracy - European Journal of Futures Research", <https://eujournalfuturesresearch.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40309-021-00183-2/>, accessed on 7-8-2022, MG]

However, polarisation processes are not to be regarded as dangerous or endangering democracy per se. To a certain extent, they are part of pluralistic societies. Historically, polarisation processes have even often been a precondition for social change towards more democracy. Polarisation often starts from below and develops bottom-up. When social movements recognise a lack of justice or opportunities for themselves or other groups and fight against it, a hardening of positions is to be expected at first, as the dominant or privileged groups feel threatened and may reject the demands. Only when the pressure of the social movement becomes so strong that it leads to a concession can polarisation develop towards democratisation. For this to happen, the polarisation process must be turned around positively through dialogue and inclusion (cf. [39], 234).

#### There are scenarios where polarisation is good to create strong social change

**Pausch, Salzburg University applied Science Political Scientist, 21** [Markus Pausch, 10-10-2021, accessed on 7-8-2022, European Journal of Futures Research, "The future of polarisation in Europe: relative cosmopolitanism and democracy - European Journal of Futures Research", <https://eujournalfuturesresearch.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40309-021-00183-2/>, accessed on 7-8-2022, MG]

In the second scenario, the initial situation is similar. Polarisers are driving society apart. Authoritarian populists with nationalist arguments face dogmatic cosmopolitans who sometimes cultivate a kind of lifestyle arrogance. The difference, however, arises in the response to the polarisation process. While in the first scenario there are no bridge-builders in a powerful position, in the second scenario a positive, democracy-promoting form of confrontation develops, based on a relative, rebellious cosmopolitanism. The reaction to the burgeoning exclusive and nationalist communitarianism is similar among some actors here as well. We assume here too, that some argue with moral appeals and disregard the realities of people’s lives. In contrast to the first scenario, however, relative cosmopolitans enter the scene and build bridges. To build democratic bridges, it is not the pushers who need to be addressed, but the undecided middle. Relative cosmopolitans avoid the two mistakes described in the first scenario. They are neither ignorant towards socio-economic and political inequality, nor are they naïve in terms of the transferability of democracy and the role of the nation state.

This cosmopolitism is relative also in the way as it does not regard the goal as an absolute dogma for which all means are justified and because it allows individuals and societies more differentiated paths to the goal. It is thus a cosmopolitanism that arises from the reality of life. It is rebellious because it includes resistance to every form of authoritarianism and to every kind of polarisation or division, not only on a political level, but on a daily life level. Dialogue is the basis of this relative, rebellious cosmopolitanism. It is what Albert Camus describes as the experience of someone who develops his solidarity from the experiences of poverty in a concrete situation [12]. It is thus not an academic or abstract universalism of a winner of globalisation, but the human solidarity of a person who develops cosmopolitanism solidarity in the experience of everyday life challenges. This turns cosmopolitanism to its humanist core. It is not founded on economic or intellectual superiority, not on the experience of being a winner, but on the contrary, on the experience of existential suffering. This can also be called cosmopolitanism from below or rooted cosmopolitanism [2, 4]. The crucial point is the one that Patrick Hayden emphasises with recourse to Camus: A cosmopolitanism that is not dogmatic, that does not itself become an ideology [28]. Michael F. Mascolo describes it from a psychological perspective and suggests a relational-dialectical approach for constructive political discourse. This approach builds bridges through dialectical engagement [37]. The inclusion and understanding of the other plays a central role in this. The characteristics of polarisation are mitigated by these strategies. Political opponents are not considered enemies. Instead of tugging at the undecided, different positions are allowed and discussed. There are a number of examples in history where such strategies based on dialogue achieved a positive effect (see [51, 57]).

In Scenario 2, the polarising strategies of the pushers are thus contrasted with a dialectical method of discourse, dialogue and democracy. However, in order to achieve this on a large scale, efforts are needed from different actors at different political levels, from the European Commission, the European Parliament, the ministries in the nation states, from regional and local authorities and finally from further organisations and interest groups. Two preconditions are necessary. At the level of legislation, a further increase in social inequality is prevented in this scenario. Rather, social action is taken to end poverty and promote inclusion. The risks of globalisation are no longer passed on to the individual, but are assumed by the state. At the same time, access opportunities to education, jobs and political participation are increased. The second crucial step is to improve the quality of democracy and dialogue. Efforts are needed here from the local level up to the supranational level. The end of the European consensus, which has long held as a permissive consensus, is being replaced by a discursive, public debate, the strengthening of the European Parliament and the introduction of different forms of participatory democracy [26].

Nation states are not replaced or overcome in this scenario, but seen as an example of how democracy can work, how dialogue and social partnership can be organised. Although they lose their veto-power, they are still crucial in decision making on the EU level as a kind of second chamber. The power of governments is not being replaced, but complemented by the power of citizens, through the further enhancement of the European Parliament and new forms of participation such as citizens’ councils at EU level [16]. However, this strengthening of the supranational level is only possible with the consent and involvement of the trade unions so that the so called losers of globalisation do not have to fear a further weakening of their interests, but quite the opposite [21]. For this to succeed, social dialogue is strengthened.

At national level, aspects of political equality are strengthened: transparency, representation and participation in parliaments and other institutions of representative democracy are actively promoted [34]. However, this is not happening because of new sanity or goodwill of the political parties, but because of public pressure arising from failures and corruption scandals. The nepotism that surfaces in many states draws public outrage and reform. These reforms are driven by examples where party control and citizen participation succeed. The citizens' councils and assemblies in Ireland, Belgium, French cities, etc. [53] inspire other states and show that democratic innovations do not have to remain elitist games, but that through certain and constantly improved procedures, less privileged groups can also gain access to political decision making. Strengthening citizenship education and democratic competences, as defined by the Council of Europe, in schools and educational institutions also plays an important role [32].

An attempt is made to create an ideal speech situation as described by Habermas in different contexts. It means that all participants have the same chance of initiation and participation in the debate. They evaluate each other’s assertion on the basis of reason and evidence and have an interest in rational consensus. The point is to exclude coercion from the debate as far as possible [24]. Even if there are justified doubts about this theory of communicative action with regard to its practicability and its many presuppositions, it can be considered an ideal to approach. Structural and social hierarchies shall be limited to a minimum. Especially at the local level, it is possible to improve the dialogue between the different population groups and their different interests [14].

In this scenario, already existing structures are expanded, promoted and funded by national and supranational authorities. This leads to people having experiences of democracy in their immediate environment that they would otherwise not have known. Bridge builders are strengthened in their work. Social workers ensure that their clients are empowered in their democratic competences. In this way, sections of the population that are most exposed to the risks of globalisation can bring their interests to bear, and it does not stop at articulation, but also leads to visible consequences. This takes the wind out of the pushers’ sails. Although they remain an important factor in the democratic game, they can no longer have the impact they had in scenario 1. The bridge builders, on the other hand, become stronger and more, motivated and encouraged by state institutions and laws that put an end to dangerous inequality.

Polarisation will not disappear in this scenario either, but it will be turned in a direction that is less dangerous and includes the chance of democratisation. In all measures, the concept of a relative, rebellious cosmopolitanism is at the forefront, which is not dogmatic and attempts to dialectically overcome the split between communitarian and cosmopolitan positions through dialogue and inclusion. Without question, this scenario is very demanding and therefore, at first glance, extremely unlikely. Above all, it cannot be assumed that all the measures mentioned will take place at all political levels at the same time. Nevertheless, already existing initiatives can certainly be strengthened by various actors. In the public debate, there is little knowledge about successful democratic innovations of different countries, regions or cities. If they receive more attention, this scenario is also less absurd than it might seem at first glance.

### No Existential Democracy Impacts

#### democracy can only produce smaller effects, not solve existential threats and impacts

**Gerring et al., University of Texas at Austin Professor of Government, University of Oslo Department of Political Science Research Professor, Singapore Applied Technology Emerson Process Management Director, , 22** (John, Carl Henrik, and Jonas, No month 2022, Annual Reviews, "Does Democracy Matter? Vol. 25:357-375", https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060820-060910#\_i18, accessed on 7-8-2022, SR)

Democracy is a manipulable treatment only in the loosest sense. Accordingly, when someone asserts, “Democracy causes Y,” it is unclear what aspect of democracy is affecting the outcome or if all aspects of this composite concept are contributing equally. Nor is it clear what the background (ceteris paribus) conditions are.

In light of these difficulties, it might seem advisable to re-specify the research question in a manner that comes closer to the potential-outcomes vision of causality. For example, one might focus on specific components of democracy (e.g., multi-party elections, universal suffrage) or types of democracy (e.g., presidentialism, federalism).

**While a more narrowly defined research agenda holds promise, one must appreciate that smaller interventions usually have smaller effects,** making it more difficult to distinguish treatment effects from background noise in the limited samples available. Moreover, the various elements that compose the concept of democracy interact with each other, making it difficult to analyze them independently. Imagine a scenario in which 20 relevant elements are associated with democracy, and the author chooses to focus on just one that is of special theoretical interest. In this scenario, one would be obliged to measure and condition on the other 19 to rule out potential confounders—a daunting task.

#### No Solvency - The fact that democracies aren’t unilateral and interact with each other just adds to the uncertainty of any solvency happening and democracy in general can be to random to depend on

**Gerring et al., University of Texas at Austin Professor of Government, University of Oslo Department of Political Science Research Professor, Singapore Applied Technology Emerson Process Management Director, , 22** (John, Carl Henrik, and Jonas, 5/2022, Annual Reviews, "Does Democracy Matter? Vol. 25:357-375", https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060820-060910#\_i18, accessed on 7-8-2022, SR)

**The fact that political institutions interact with each other also makes it challenging to aggregate up our understanding of the parts of democracy into an understanding of the whole.** Political systems exhibit strong holistic properties. During periods of regime change, many of their component elements change together.

Thus, despite its ambiguities, the macro-level question of regimes remains indispensable. We need to know whether being governed by democratic rules matters for outcomes that we care about. We believe that it is possible to bring democracy into the potential-outcomes framework so long as these ambiguities are recognized and claims are suitably qualified by caveats. **Specifically, we view democracy as a composite variable that can, in some instances, be considered as an as-if-random treatment.** One such occasion is foreign intervention—either prodemocratic (e.g., the Allied occupation and reconstruction of Germany and Japan) or antidemocratic (e.g., the US-engineered coups in Chile and Iran). Another occasion is when leaders accidentally inaugurate a democratic transition (e.g., Gorbachev in the USSR) (Treisman 2020).

### No Elections Impact

#### No Link - Disinformation does not affect elections and elections are not key to democracy

Mckay and Tenove, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver; Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate and Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 20

(Spencer Mckay, The University Of British Columbia Vancouver Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions Research Associate, Chris Tenove, Chris Tenove, University of British Columbia Political Science Postdoctoral Research Fellow. SAGE Journals, 7-4-2020, "Disinformation as a Threat to Deliberative Democracy," Political Research Quarterly 2021, Vol. 74. No. 3, p. 734, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1065912920938143, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

How might disinformation harm democracy? One possibility, which has received extensive attention from policymakers and researchers, is that disinformation may change election outcomes. This emphasis has serious limitations. First, concerns about disinformation changing electoral outcomes may be overblown. There is an ongoing debate about whether disinformation can significantly influence voting preferences (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler 2018), in part because voting preferences tend to be relatively stable despite campaign messaging (Kalla and Broockman 2018). Second, empirical research shows that disinformation campaigns are frequently designed to achieve goals other than changing election outcomes, such as undermining the institutions and social conditions necessary for democracies to function. Third, from a normative perspective, democracy is not reducible to elections. As a complement to an emphasis on electoral outcomes, we argue that a deliberative democracy framework can help clarify the normative harms of disinformation in ways that make sense of the growing empirical literature on the tactics, aims, and outcomes of disinformation campaigns.

### US Liberal Int’l Order Fails

#### The U.S. strategy to strengthening the liberal order is simply outdated and has no way of solving as they promote exclusionary practices

Beckley, Harvard international security fellow ,22

[Michael Beckley, 4/2022, Foreign Affairs, "Enemies of My Enemy: How Fear of China Is Forging a New World Order.,", https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=gonzagaufoley&id=GALE%7CA694983389&v=2.1&it=r, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy, Accessed 7-8-2022, LASA-LR]

For decades, the United States and its allies knew what they stood for and who the enemy was. But then the Soviet Union collapsed, and a single overarching threat gave way to a kaleidoscope of minor ones. In the new and uncertain post-Cold War environment, the Western allies sought refuge in past sources of success. Instead of building a new order, they doubled down on the existing one. Their enemy may have disintegrated, but their mission, they believed, remained the same: to enlarge the community of free-market democracies. For the next three decades, they worked to expand the Western liberal order into a global one. NATO membership nearly doubled. The European Community morphed into the EU, a full-blown economic union with more than twice as many member countries. The GATT was transformed into the World Trade Organization (wro) and welcomed dozens of new members, unleashing an unprecedented period of hyperglobalization.

But it couldn't last. The liberal order, like all international orders, is a form of organized hypocrisy that contains the seeds of its own demise. To forge a cohesive community, order builders have to exclude hostile nations, outlaw uncooperative behaviors, and squelch domestic opposition to international rule-making. These inherently repressive acts eventually trigger a backlash. In the mid-nineteenth century, it came in the form of a wave of liberal revolutions, which eroded the unity and ideological coherence of the monarchical Concert of Europe. During the 1930s, aggrieved fascist powers demolished the liberal interwar order that stood in the way of their imperial ambitions. By the late 1940s, the Soviet Union had spurned the global order it had helped negotiate just a few years prior, having gobbled up territory in Eastern Europe in contravention of the UN Charter.

Many in the West had long assumed that the liberal order would be an exception to the historical pattern. The system's commitment to openness and nondiscrimination supposedly made it "hard to overturn and easy to join," as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry argued in these pages in 2008. Any country, large or small, could plug and play in the globalized economy. Liberal institutions could accommodate all manner of members--even illiberal ones, which would gradually be reformed by the system into responsible stakeholders. As more countries joined, a virtuous cycle would play out: free trade would generate prosperity, which would spread democracy, which would enhance international cooperation, which would lead to more trade. Most important, the order faced no major opposition, because it had already defeated its main enemy. The demise of Soviet communism had sent a clear message to all that there was no viable alternative to democratic capitalism.

These assumptions turned out to be wrong. The liberal order is, in fact, deeply exclusionary. By promoting free markets, open borders, democracy, supranational institutions, and the use of reason to solve problems, the order challenges traditional beliefs and institutions that have united communities for centuries: state sovereignty, nationalism, religion, race, tribe, family. These enduring ties to blood and soil were bottled up during the Cold War, when the United States and its allies had to maintain a united front to contain the Soviet Union. But they have reemerged over the course of the post-Cold War era. "We are going to do a terrible thing to you," the Soviet official Georgi Arbatov told a U.S. audience in 1988. "We are going to deprive you of an enemy." The warning proved prescient. By slaying its main adversary, the liberal order unleashed all sorts of nationalist, populist, religious, and authoritarian opposition.

### Turn - Liberal International Order Inequality

#### Inequality and economic inequality are inherent in the Liberal International Order (LIO)

**Gerring et al., University of Texas at Austin Professor of Government, University of Oslo Department of Political Science Research Professor, Singapore Applied Technology Emerson Process Management Director, , 22** (John, Carl Henrik, and Jonas, 5/2022, Annual Reviews, "Does Democracy Matter? Vol. 25:357 375", https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060820-060910#\_i18, accessed on 7-8-2022, SR)

Convergence Across Countries, Divergence Within Them

The triumph of the LIO in the 1980s and 1990s—the collapse of Communism, the dismantling of trade barriers, the strengthening of institutions of international governance—coupled with, and facilitated by, breakthrough innovations in transport, communication, and finance, affected economic inequality in two ways that standard factor-endowment theories predicted: inequality declined significantly between countries, thus beginning to erode three centuries of the Great Divergence between rich and poor nations**; but inequality within countries, especially among the advanced economies, increased almost as sharply.**

Between countries. As late as 1990, the richest percent of the world's population earned on average over ninety times what the poorest decile received; only twenty years later, that ratio had fallen to sixty-five times,or only slightly more than the within-country ratio of Brazil, where in 2008 the average income of the richest decile was about fifty times that of the poorest.

Within countries. Beginning even earlier, inequality of incomes, whether measured as the Gini index or the share of total income accruing to the top decile, has risen in virtually all of the advanced economies, and indeed in many of the middle-income ones. Bourguignon notes that the collapse of the Soviet empire and the opening of China, India, and Latin America injected roughly “a billion workers, for the most part unskilled, into international competition.” That will have drastically lowered the global capital-labor ratio and hence further raised returns on human and physical capital, while reducing those on low-skill labor, in virtually all but the poorest, most labor-abundant countries.

In short, across much of the globe**, the enormous overall gains from trade have benefited the highly skilled, the inventive entrepreneurs, and the owners of capital; the incomes of the less skilled and the capital-poor have risen more slowly, stagnated, or actually declined**—exactly the development whose early manifestations alarmed Dani Rodrik two decades ago.

Surely not all of the rise in inequality stems from globalization. Many analyses attribute much of the widening within-country gap—in the US, perhaps as much as four-fifths—not to globalization but to skill-biased technological innovation. Bourguignon contends, to be sure, that innovation has been largely endogenous to globalization: wider markets and intensified competition have raised the returns on cost-reducing innovation. **Cheaper labor, however, whether from offshoring or the competition of low-wage imports, might be expected to curtail the demand for labor-saving technologies, not to increase it.** A stronger case is implied by “new new” trade theory: if managerial pay correlates closely with firm size, and if the most successful firms in a globalized economy tend to be the largest, it follows that globalization contributes directly to the rise in top incomes.19 Perhaps most importantly, however, whatever skill-biased innovation may have contributed to the gains of the top quintile or decile, it can say little about the gains of the top 1, or 0.1, percent of the distribution.**Trade, as we argue, can more readily explain those disproportionate gains.**

#### Backlash against the Liberal International Order came from the LIO itself because of rising inequality

**Flaherty, University of California San Diego Political Science PhD candidate and Rogowski, University of California Los Angeles Political Science Distinguished Professor, 21** (Thomas M and Ronald , May 2021, International Organization; Cambridge International Organization; Cambridge Vol. 75, Iss. 2, , "Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order", DOI:10.1017/S0020818321000163, Proquest, accessed on 7-8-2022, SR)

Presiding over the November 2016 meeting of the International Political Economy Society, which followed that year's US presidential election by only three days, David Lake began by saying, “To our theories, this result unfortunately comes as no surprise.” And indeed the field at large has believed **that the growing “populist”1 backlash against the Liberal International Order** (LIO)—not just the Trump victory but Brexit, the election of illiberal governments in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, the Philippines, and Brazil (to name only a few), and growing support for anti-immigrant and illiberal parties and candidates in many other democracies—**has followed almost inevitably from the very changes the LIO has wrought, including of course increased trade and migration but also one major concomitant, rising economic inequality within states.** According to our traditional economic theories,2 advanced and even middle-income countries are abundantly endowed with human capital, and poorly endowed with low-skill labor. And it is a rudimentary implication of international economics that, in those countries, expanded trade—or, even more, immigration of low-skill workers—will benefit the highly skilled and harm the less educated. Inequality will rise, and—perhaps the most prescient conclusion of the traditional analysis—partisanship will correlate increasingly with possession of human capital: opposition to the LIO will be strongest among the least educated and will decrease monotonically with more years of schooling.

#### The aff can’t solve the underlying problem with the LIO which is that it INCREASES inequality which can lead to international conflict because of tensions (heg bad)

**Flaherty, University of California San Diego Political Science PhD candidate and Rogowski, University of California Los Angeles Political Science Distinguished Professor, 21** (Thomas M and Ronald , May 2021, International Organization; Cambridge International Organization; Cambridge Vol. 75, Iss. 2, , "Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order", DOI:10.1017/S0020818321000163, Proquest, accessed on 7-8-2022, SR)

None of this suggests, of course, that rising inequality is the only, or even necessarily the most important, cause of the growing popular backlash against the LIO. Skill-biased technological innovation and resistance to cultural change also matter, as we discuss more fully later. We do find, however, at least from a cursory analysis of European elections, that backlash against shocks from immigration and imports is conditional on high inequality, disappearing where inequality is low; and we suspect that rising “top-heavy” inequality is related to a particularly prominent strain, within the antiglobalization movements, of anti-elite and anti-expert sentiment.

We go on to suggest why rising inequality matters, not only as a source of opposition to the LIO but as an impediment to economic growth and an exacerbant of domestic polarization and international conflict.

### AT: Democracy Solves Inequality

#### Aff relies on democratic institutions that doesn’t help inequality

**Gerring et al., University of Texas at Austin Professor of Government, University of Oslo Department of Political Science Research Professor, Singapore Applied Technology Emerson Process Management Director, , 22** (John, Carl Henrik, and Jonas, 5/2022, Annual Reviews, "Does Democracy Matter? Vol. 25:357-375", https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060820-060910#\_i18, accessed on 7-8-2022, SR)

Although relatively few studies suggest that @emoeraey produces undesirable consequences, results from the surveyed studies are inconclusive for the outcomes of fiscal policy, infrastructure and industry, investment, social transfer programs, and disaster preparedness. **For inequality, inflation, and public spending, there is no case for democracy producing desirable outcomes**, according to the metrics in Table 3

t has refused, so far, to remove Trump’s tariffs on China, a step that would help ease inflation, for fear of surrendering a diplomatic advantage. This turns the post-Cold War norm on its head: Calculations of geopolitical risk are now trumping calculations of economic efficiency. To be sure, interdependence is hardly a thing of the past. US trade in goods with China was more than $650 billion last year, and American companies such as Tesla nc. and Apple nc. are doing more, not less, business with Beijing.

But the basic trend is toward a more balkanized global economy, in which key rivals aim to seal off dangerous vulnerabilities and manipulate the terms of interdependence to their advantage. And if recent experience is any indication, this process will happen gradually until it happens rapidly — when a grave crisis erupts, as in Ukraine, and sunders ties that had seemed unbreakable not long before.

Structurally speaking, the US is well positioned. **America and the other advanced democracies possess a clear majority of global production and wealth.** If they, plus key developing states such as India, deepen their integration with each other while limiting it with their rivals, **they can create a free-world economy more vibrant than anything China, let alone Russia, can muster.**

### Turn - Western Countries Engage Too

#### Turn - Disinformation campaigns are not a strictly authoritarian mechanism – the plan monopolizes the space for western nations.

Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, and Ertan, Boğaziçi University, Department of International Trade Assistant Professor, 22

(Akin Unver, Ozyegin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, Arhan S. Ertan, Bogazici University, Department of International Trade Assistant Professor, Social Science Research Network, 5-2-2022, "The Strategic Logic of Digital Disinformation: Offense, Defence and Deterrence in Information Warfare," p. 2, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4098988, accessed 7-5-2022) SS:/

While disinformation has largely been constructed as a form of ‘attack’ perpetrated by authoritarian countries against liberal democracies, more democratic countries too, have engaged in organized disinformation attempts abroad. For example, both France and Russia engaged in disinformation campaigns in Mali, Central African Republic and other Sahel region countries to build influence and discredit opponents.2 US State Department had a long-running program of digital disinformation against Jihadi content online, inserting its analysts into extremist discussions via pseudonyms and sharing false information to misdirect the militant group’s online efforts.3 In Hungary, the government used disinformation against Romania in order to make the case internationally that the refugee crisis was Bucharest’s fault. Similarly, both Belarus and Poland instrumentalized disinformation during the most recent Ukrainian refugee crisis.4 A 2021 European Parliament report has indicated that disinformation between nations have become rampant in Western Balkans, disrupting the political stability of the region and generating significant discrediting momentum for the EU.5 From Brazil, Argentina to South Africa, India and Australia, a broad range of countries and regime types have been involved in organized disinformation.6

### Turn – Self Censorship

#### Always focusing on fake news instills a culture of self-censorship

**Lim, Harvard Kennedy School's Shorenstein Center Technology and Social Change Research Project Researcher, 20**

(Gabrielle, 8-7-2020, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation ", https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation/, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

First, the widespread use of the term “fake news” combined with concerns over national security (although often sincere and well-meaning) have given illiberal and authoritarian-leaning governments around the world top cover to enact a range of censorship-enabling measures that are then used to crack down on dissent, target political opponents and instill a culture of self-censorship. In the Philippines — where President Rodrigo Duterte continues to prosecute a “war on drugs” that has led to the deaths of thousands — penalties for spreading false and alarming information were included in a special measures bill to combat COVID-19. Critics of the bill warn that it will be selectively used to punish political opponents and deter dissent. Last year, Singapore — which has continually ranked poorly for press freedom — also passed a law targeting “fake news” and false information. Citing examples of foreign interference in the United States and the United Kingdom, Singapore justified the bill on the grounds of national security. **Borrowing a common refrain from the West, the government stated that falsehoods “weaponised, to attack the infrastructure of fact, destroy trust and attack societies.”** Now Nigeria, again in the name of national security, is mulling its own bill targeting false information, which has widely been mocked as a copy-paste of Singapore’s law.

### Turn – Repressive Policies

#### The aff’s countermeasures against disinformation rely on repressive strategies instead of focusing domestic policy that helps build trust in the government

**Lim, Harvard Kennedy School's Shorenstein Center Technology and Social Change Research Project Researcher, 20**

(Gabrielle, 8-7-2020, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation ", https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation/, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

Third, **an overemphasis on “bad actors” and their supply of disinformation diverts our attention from the material problems that drive our demand for and receptivity to dubious content of suspicious origin**. In a commentary for the Harvard Kennedy School’s Misinformation Review, Alexei Abrahams and I **argue that thus far the focus of the West’s countermeasures in the fight against misinformation and disinformation has relied on repressive strategies** — root out the networks, shut down the accounts and remove the content. However, this strategy is, as many have pointed out already, a never-ending “game of whack-a-mole” that (at best) provides short-term tactical gains. These palliative measures must be coupled with long-term solutions that take aim at the reasons why people flock to fringe websites and dubious accounts for their news. It is not that we want to be lied to, but rather that our trust in the institutions and authorities to which we delegate our well-being and future has eroded. As such, redressive strategies should also be explored to regain and restore trust and legitimacy in our institutions, politicians and governing bodies. And, where possible, domestic policy should be directed at making democratic participation easier. **“Bad actors” will always be around and try to mess with information systems, but we can choose to make voting easier, prevent gerrymandering, and amend or repeal laws that lead to voter suppression**.

### Democracy Bad for Environment

#### Democracy effectively hurts the environment through monopolizing the environment simply for economic results

Akalin and Edrogan, Dumlupinar University department of economics , Sakarya University Vocational School, 20

[Guray Akalin and Sinan Edrogan , 10-7-2020, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, "Does democracy help reduce environmental degradation?,", <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-020-11096-1>, https://rdcu.be/cRg6d, Accessed 7-8-2022, LASA-LR]

Although most SDG researches have focused on the economic growth and environment nexus, the institutions and environment nexus have largely remained unexplored. Particularly, how democracy and environment interact was not made clear as well; and, different approaches asserted by researchers to unveil the theoretical background of democracy-environment nexus. Olson (1996) states that compatibility nexus between democracy and economic growth means that democracy increases economic growth as well as resource use; hence, it can be said that democracy does not promote actions on diminishing environmental pollutions and emissions. In other words, democracy creates a better investment climate by protecting private property rights and promoting individual entrepreneurship, which boosts economic growth, raises resource use, and hurts the environmental quality. Hillman and Ursprung (1992) stated that the effect of democracy on the environment varies by depending on the institutional mechanism of policy choice. The majority of society determines the policies in case of the existence of direct democracy. Therefore, environmental policies are determined by median voters, and policy-makers cannot adopt policies based on discretion. However, the policy-makers adopt discretion-based policies in case of representative democracy. The existence of representative democracy could lead to the arise of principal-agent problems. In such a case, individuals cannot monitor policies determined by agents, and decisions of policy-makers can be affected by lobby groups. Dryzek (1987) asserts that democracy is a regime in which lobbying groups seeking profit maximization have a significant political impact. Thus, the government might be affected by lobbying and may prioritize private interests over the public interest (Olson 1982). In contrast, autocratic regimes might deny lobbying demands that hurt environmental quality in favor of the public interest. Beyond that, because of political myopia, democratically elected governments might also be more lacking in commitment to long-term action plans than nonelected autocratic regimes (Bernauer and Koubi 2009). In other words, pollution abatement requires long-term commitment, and democratically elected governments might be unwilling to choose policies that limit resource use and slow economic growth down instead of vote-saving policies such as boosting economic growth. Therefore, democratically elected governments might be less successful in providing public goods such as a clean environment than nonelected regimes.

#### Democracy incentivizes economic growth and prioritizes it over the environment, allowing for terrible degrading effects to ensue on the environment as a result

Akalin and Edrogan, Dumlupinar University department of economics , Sakarya University Vocational School, 20

[Guray Akalin and Sinan Edrogan , 10-7-2020, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, "Does democracy help reduce environmental degradation?,", https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-020-11096-1, https://rdcu.be/cRg6d, Accessed 7-8-2022, LASA-LR]

In the first part of our analysis, we performed cross-sectional dependency and homogeneity tests, which revealed that there is a cross-sectional dependence in the panel model and the slope coefficients are heterogeneous. To estimate the long-term relationship between variables, we used the AMG approach in the second part of our analysis. The AMG estimation results and its corresponding policy implications are as follows: an increase in economic growth decreases environmental quality. To eliminate the environmental cost of economic growth, it would be better to adopt a more inclusive and eco-friendly development approach that substitutes pollutant-production technology based on nonrenewable resources, with technologies that use eco-friendly renewable resources.

Democracy has an aggravating effect on environmental degradation. Therefore, the regulatory agencies could reduce the adverse effect of democracy on the environment by limiting the power of lawmakers to permit excessive resource use. Thus, by deflecting the impact of private economic interests through government regulation, the adverse effect of democracy on the environment would be reduced. In addition, to ensure the sustainability of environmental policies, governments should declare an “ecological constitution,” which is not affected by political elections and thus cannot be easily changed. Furthermore, decision-makers should create new platforms for demanding environmental improvements and ensure that inspection mechanisms are put in place to monitor these changes.

## Solvency Answers

### MISFITS - Solvency

#### NATO needs to make a consensus on what form of cyber attack will trigger Article 5

Becker, West Post International Relations professor, et al., 6-28-22

[Jordan, Douglas Lute, former U.S. permanent representative to NATO, & Simon Smith, Simon Smith is an associate professor at Staffordshire University and is the editor-in-chief of Defence Studies, 6-28-22, War on the Rocks, "Don’t Let Russia Dominate the Strategic Concept - War on the Rocks", <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/>, accessed on 7-2-22, MG]

Whether in coordination or not, China and Russia will undoubtedly continue to challenge allies in domains like space and cyber using emerging and emerged technologies. Dealing with such challenges is core NATO business — grounded in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and resting primarily with national authorities. The new Strategic Concept should aim to integrate these relatively new domains while responding to disruptive technologies as well. Allies must endeavor to reach a “pre-crisis” consensus on what space and cyber actions would constitute an “armed attack” in accordance with Article 5. This kind of crisis decision-making is a core function of NATO’s political and military headquarters. Such agreement, when paired with improved national capabilities, would contribute to deterrence by communicating resolve to adversaries. Improved capabilities themselves will only arise through public-private partnership to maintain a technological edge. A common strategic culture of innovation, much of which arises from the private sector, is a key advantage that NATO has — and should retain — over its adversaries. Such innovation has been on display in the Russo-Ukrainian war and will doubtless be essential in future conflicts.

National Resilience Although defending human and physical infrastructure from asymmetric threats is inherently national business, NATO itself can serve as a platform for coordinating allied responses to these challenges. NATO allies agreed on seven baseline requirements for national resilience at their 2016 Warsaw Summit. They have also “improve[d] their cyber resilience by introducing capability targets” into the NATO Defence Planning Process.

Recently, however, national resilience has been challenged in additional areas, which should be reflected. Specifically, NATO should address democratic backsliding, election interference, and economic and information manipulation. Specifically, NATO’s requirements for national resilience should be upgraded to require national safeguards against democratic backsliding. Prior to taking up her position as the senior U.S. Department of Defense official in Europe, Rachel Ellehuus highlighted the vulnerabilities laid bare by such backsliding and argued that “the trans-Atlantic alliance will only remain strong if members genuinely abide by its founding principles.” By incorporating such safeguards into NATO’s systems for monitoring allies’ defense preparations, allies can shape one another’s political, economic, and security incentives in ways that reduce these vulnerabilities.

Allies should also agree to reduce dramatically their reliance on non-allied energy — the vulnerabilities inherent in German dependence on Russian gas have been exposed during the Russo-Ukrainian war. Progress toward independence cannot come fast enough. Finally, non-allied ownership of critical infrastructure, especially transportation and telecommunications, poses risks that have not yet materialized in the same way as energy dependency but are just as dangerous. The risks should be explicitly addressed in the strategic concept, and concrete steps toward mitigation should increase accordingly. Military mobility remains a critical infrastructural challenge that allies should also explicitly grapple with in coordination with the European Union. As in the cyber realm, the NATO Defence Planning Process may be an appropriate venue for these efforts.

# NEG Off-Case

## NATO Focus DA

### NATO Focus DA – Disinformation Link

#### Disinformation policy shifts NATO focus from core missions

\**raisons d’être = reason or justification for existence*

Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, and Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, 22

(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 6-7, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

The logic of interpreting how disinformation gets securitized by relying on NATO documents is two-fold: first, NATO has been evolving to find new *raisons d’être* since the end of the Cold War and has sought to capitalize on the securitization of new threats, such as terrorism, cybersecurity, Syria, and forced migration.38 Disinformation and information war are two of the recent additions to this threat portfolio that helps us understand how NATO’s discourses on security adapt to a new-medium threat. Second, it enables us to understand how institutional security arrangements like NATO reinvent their security identities and construct their amity-enmity relations in light of newer technologies. Since identity and action are considered closely linked in constructivism, and because they are never fixed or intrinsic, but are rather fluid and constituted through social processes, studying longitudinal securitization dynamics gives us valuable insight into long-term NATO security planning.39

## Security K

### Security K – Disinformation Link

#### Link and Impact Turn – Disinformation discourses create an empty signifier to distract from problems at home by constructing political opponents and countries as external threats – Creates self-censorships of journalists and increases authoritarian norms.

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(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 3-4, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

Critics of Western disinformation discourses, for example, argue that such discourses have turned into ‘floating (or empty) signifiers’ that have no specific or agreed-upon meaning.12 In that vein, blaming others for engaging in disinformation often detracts attention from a mistake or failed policy enacted by the blamer.13 In this case, critics argue that Western discourses on disinformation are intended to distract attention from NATO or EU divisions, or more domestic-level polarization dynamics, by creating a unique empty signifier (disinformation) to be employed as a rallying rhetoric that bolsters the significance of external threats.14 In this way, disinformation and its associated terms, like misinformation, fake news, and information war, get securitized, receiving disproportionate levels of attention in the policy domain. In this context, disinformation and its associated terms are used to exaggerate an existing threat and create a rallying discourse meant to channel the attention of divided Western nations away from their internal disagreements and towards an inflated external threat. Some scholars go even further, arguing that disinformation is being securitized in the West (especially in NATO) to the extent that the ‘war on terror’ was securitized through the 2000s.15 In this line, disinformation is alleged to have become a new strategic glue intended to help Western nations pool together their increasingly diverging interests and resources in support of a common cause.16

Securitization of disinformation in domestic politics is relatively well-studied.17 Although these terms entered mainstream debates after the 2016 US elections, former President Donald Trump, too, securitized fake news to delegitimize his opponents by constructing rival disinformation as a national security problem, indirectly attributable to China.18 Following the tornado of accusations in the US, political actors in Britain, France, Italy, South Africa, Kenya and others have begun blaming each other for engaging in organized disinformation.19 Even in Sweden, there is empirical evidence that suggests accusing journalists of spreading fake news results in the self-censorship of such outlets.20 There are further cases of evidence supporting the claim that elite-level discourses on disinformation have a direct effect on how society perceives information and facts in general, creating a measurable effect on public trust towards such facts and information.21 In Singapore, for example, delegitimizing rival parties and news outlets through disinformation discourse is considered ‘acceptable’ as part of the state’s duty to discipline the opposition and its political actors.22 Similar trends emerging in democracies and authoritarian countries alike, such as in Austria, Australia, Poland, Russia, and South Africa, demonstrate the universality of instrumentalizing disinformation discourse as a political delegitimization tactic.23

#### Link - The securitization of disinformation is weaponized to muddle healthy debate by constructing political adversaries as a threat.

\*This card has definitions for disinfo, misinfo, and securitization!

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(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 4-5, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

Over the last few years, defining misleading content and measuring the legitimacy of its dissemination have been at the forefront of journalistic, political, and scientific debates.24 Even before its proliferation in 2016, disinformation was a widely-used term in mainstream discourse, co-existing with other terms such as infoglut, or information overload.25 While disinformation and misinformation were first used interchangeably, today, disinformation refers to the deliberate dissemination of false information with the intention of misleading and confusing an audience. Misinformation, on the other hand, strictly refers to the unintended diffusion of false information without malintent. There are also bridge terms such as ‘malinformation’, which refers to information that is factually accurate but is deployed to damage the image of an individual or an entity, or the concept of ‘problematic information’ as defined by Caroline Jack.26 Although it is not directly mentioned, all of these concepts refer to the digital space, where information manipulation is disseminated faster and more broadly on social media and digital communication technologies as compared to other forms of media.

As the terms ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, ‘information operation’, and ‘hybrid war’ are often used interchangeably in political discourse, there are little clear-cut differences in the strategic meaning of each word choice.27 Politicians and leaders often use these terms as a bag of buzzwords without a clear operational definition of what each term precisely means. All of these buzzwords generate roughly the same effect, the delegitimization of their target, on consumers of such messages.28 Especially problematic is the \*fact that once the discourse on disinformation is weaponized to delegitimize rivals, there is very little such rivals can do to defend themselves. Given the significant political charge of these terms, individuals or institutions that are alleged to be engaging in disinformation-related activities often have to enter into a fruitless spar of words to challenge such allegations, which usually leads to further controversy. This renders the accuser – or the side that securitizes disinformation – more advantageous compared to the accused, generating a dynamic similar to the ‘attacker’s advantage’ in cyber security, where the defender is continuously blindsided.29

Therefore, the securitization of disinformation – that is, discursively constructing disinformation as a security concern – is becoming almost as controversial as disinformation itself, and can often be deployed to muddle the waters of a healthy debate. Its problem lies within its success; namely, how successfully disinformation gets securitized and rallies policy resources around itself. This fits into Buzan et. al.’s criteria for a ‘successful speechact’, which should take place in a medium most appropriate for its dissemination and have a clear, mobilizable referent object (i.e. ‘those that spread disinformation’).30 By securitizing disinformation in the medium that is most conducive for its dissemination (social media and the Internet), speakers get a chance to use the speed and volume advantage of digital communication technologies against their opponents. Also, such discursive constructions must be sedimented (1) rhetorically: have a clear argumentative function, (2) discursively: contain clear power and hegemonic relations within, (3) culturally: refer to a well-known case or instance, and (4) institutionally: in a way that mobilizes policy resources.31

Yet, for the Copenhagen school, not all speech acts constitute securitization. Securitization is a very particular discursive construct that designates a specific existential threat requiring the mobilization of uncommon resources and measures that go beyond the norms of institutional and political responses.32 In many cases, securitization happens to trigger and facilitate these institutional changes by ‘shocking’ power brokers and bureaucracies into action, either through internal bureaucratic peer pressure, or through public opinion pressure (audience costs). As such, disinformation has been lifted ‘above politics’ in Western rhetoric as a peculiar threat that requires the sidelining of daily political squabbles, mobilizing unique resources, and addressing it in unity that would otherwise not materialize.33 Ultimately, the discursive constructions of disinformation constitute acute cases of securitization as they generate amity-enmity relations only among countries that adopt this discursive strategy.34

#### The securitization of disinformation discredits competitors by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth.

\*This card explicitly states it has not studied the impact at the international level

Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, and Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, 22

(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 2, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to influence, mislead, and confuse foreign populations have assumed a central position in global debates about politics and foreign policy. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization, and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a central position.6 However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, and ‘information operations’ have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse, assuming an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’7 and has become acutely visible in the foreign policy domain as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to similarly discredit and delegitimize rival countries.8 Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.

### Security K – NATO Disinformation Policy Link

#### Link - Securitization of disinformation is how NATO evolves to maintain its reason for existence.

\**raisons d’être = reason or justification for existence*

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(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 6-7, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

The logic of interpreting how disinformation gets securitized by relying on NATO documents is two-fold: first, NATO has been evolving to find new *raisons d’être* since the end of the Cold War and has sought to capitalize on the securitization of new threats, such as terrorism, cybersecurity, Syria, and forced migration.38 Disinformation and information war are two of the recent additions to this threat portfolio that helps us understand how NATO’s discourses on security adapt to a new-medium threat. Second, it enables us to understand how institutional security arrangements like NATO reinvent their security identities and construct their amity-enmity relations in light of newer technologies. Since identity and action are considered closely linked in constructivism, and because they are never fixed or intrinsic, but are rather fluid and constituted through social processes, studying longitudinal securitization dynamics gives us valuable insight into long-term NATO security planning.39

#### Link – The language NATO uses to securitize disinformation reflects a discursive anchoring in United States institutional influence.

Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, and Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, 22

(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 11-12, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

The differences between NATO official texts and tweets are particularly interesting. Although NATO official texts shift from a ‘hybrid war’-focused discourse to ‘disinformation’ focused discourse by 2018, the reliance on ‘disinformation’ discourse in tweets is more striking. By late 2016 (the US elections), ‘disinformation’ becomes a clear discursive choice in NATO tweets, skyrocketing in much of 2020 due to COVID and vaccine-related securitization discourses globally. This could be interpreted as the discursive anchoring capacity of the United States for NATO, as the constructions of securitization in American political culture affects the wider institutional discourse of NATO. Perhaps as the clearest sign of the temporal variations in word choice shifts, NATO’s Twitter accounts use the words ‘disinformation’, ‘information warfare’, and ‘misinformation’ overwhelmingly more often in comparison with its official texts and statements, which rely more on ‘cyber war’ and ‘hybrid war’. As for NATO and affiliated accounts that use the keyword ‘disinformation’, four clear accounts stand out. These are @STRATCOMCOE (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence), @NATOmoscow (NATO Information Office Moscow), @NATOBrazeB (NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy), and @NATOpress (Official Twitter account of the @NATO Spokesperson). As for which NATO country representations use this word the most, Latvia (@LV\_NATO), Lithuania (@LitdelNATO), United States (@ USNATO), Ukraine (@NATOinUkraine) and Germany (@GermanyNATO) stand out the most.

### Security K – Russian Disinformation Link

#### Link – The securitization of disinformation is a continuation of NATO’s cold war rivalry.

Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor, and Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, 22

(Akın Ünver, Özyeğin University Department of International Relations Associate Professor and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Political Science and Public Administration Research Assistant, All Azimuth, 6/15/2022 “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” p. 18-19, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1110500 https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Unver-and-Kurnaz\_SecuritizationofDisinformation.pdf, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

Overall, our analysis has shown that NATO still defines its security identity against Russia, and there has not been a significant shift in NATO’s securitization dynamics since the Cold War, as evidenced by our comparative analysis of older and newer NATO texts. Although Chinese disinformation attempts have also begun to enter NATO’s threat-related language, the organization’s primary discursive security identity continues to develop against and around Russia. This is most evident in our longitudinal analysis of the pre- and post 2014 documents that similarly prioritize Russia as a threat, implying that it is not really the disinformation or fake news agenda that is rendering Russia a threat for NATO. This bolsters the hypothesis that even if technologies change, the NATO-Russia rivalry will remain securitized in the same way. In other words, the contemporary disinformation and fake news agenda is a continuation of the same NATO-Russia rivalry – at least in discursive form – through newer mediums.

### Security K – Impact – Turns Democracy

#### Securitizing disinformation undermines democratic institutions

**Tenove, University of British Columbia Department of Political Science Fellow, 20**

(Chris, 07-2020, The International Journal of Press/Politics, "Protecting Democracy from Disinformation: Normative Threats and Policy Responses”, https://doi.org/10.11772F1940161220918740, p. 524 & 525, SAGE journals, accessed on 7-2-2022, SR)

‘Treating disinformation as a national security threat often makes sense. Disinformation tactics could undermine a people's capacity to enact its decisions via their democratic government (such as by fabricating orders from public officials), or compromise a people's ability to contribute to rule making (such as by circulating news ofa natural disaster on a voting day). Furthermore, foreign governments can mobilize enormous resources, and so governments may similarly need to martial their capacities to coun- teract them. Indeed, only state security agencies have the combination of signals intelligence and human intelligence needed to discover coordinated and covert disin- formation campaigns.

**However, security agencies have fraught relationships with democracy.** Their inter- ference in domestic political affairs can lead to excessive influence in democratic pro- cesses by the governing party or by security agencies themselves. A national security logic may unduly interpret false or partly false communications as security risks, rather than as opportunities for correction and debate. As Farrell and Schneier (2018) observe, national security frameworks tend to see opportunities for contentious com- ‘munication as vulnerabilities rather than virtues: “This means thatthe national security approach has enormous difficulties in assessing the appropriate trade-offs that are needed to guarantee a well-functioning democracy” (p. 5).

Moreover, a national security-focused approach can shift policy making and espe- cially policy enforcement to government agencies that tend to be under weak demo- cratic control. **The national security agencies of many countries “are typically subject to** limited oversight and accountability, and are historically separated from the citi- zenry by secrecy, hierarchy, and **virtually unchecked executive power**” (Deibert 2018: 413). This issue can be seen in struggles by journalism organizations to report on security agencies, even in countries with strong protections for a free press (Lidberg and Muller 2018).

**The repressive use of national security laws against disinformation by authoritar- jan countries is well-documented (Henley 2018), but concerns have also been raised about security policies in democracies.** One example is Taiwan’s response to poten- tial Chinese disinformation operations. In the lead-up to the 2020 election, Taiwan passed the Anti-Infiltration Act that targets foreign interference through disinformation, lobbying, and other means (Aspinwall 2020). The government also pressured its National Communications Commission to crack down on domestic news organizations for false and biased reporting that may advance China’s influ- ence. The former head of the Commission, who allegedly resigned because she did not agree with this crackdown, warned, “The government says disinformation is the enemy of an open and democratic society . . . But we don’t want to lose that open. society by fighting against it” (Aspinwall 2020).

## EU CP

### EU CP Solvency

#### The EU should adopt a pooling of capabilities on a voluntary basis

**Liederkerke, Rasmussen Global Policy Advisor and Laudrain, Centre for Doctoral Training in Cybersecurity Department of Politics and International Relations Research Student, 22**

(Arthur and Arthur, 3-30-2022, Council on Foreign Relations, "Russia’s Cyber War: What’s Next and What the European Union Should Do.", https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-cyber-war-whats-next-and-what-european-union-should-do, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

Contrary to widespread expectations, the use of cyberweaponry in the Russian war with Ukraine has so far been limited. To date, the only significant, sophisticated operations with suspected Russian involvement are the attacks on communications giant Viasat’s satellite networks, attempts to install data-wiping malware on Ukrainian government systems, and attacks against two major Ukrainian telecommunications firms.

There are several reasons that can plausibly explain why cyber operations have remained marginal in the conflict. First, the Ukrainians have done a good job at bolstering their digital defenses, helped in part by their American allies. There are also the inherent limitations of cyberattacks: in an all-out kinetic war, missiles offer a faster and more effective means of achieving strategic objectives than lines of code.

Last, but certainly not least, it is worth remembering that we are in the early stages of a war that will drag on, potentially for months, leaving plenty of time for new Russian cyber operations. Apparent reluctance to use cyber capabilities beyond limited operational-level hits or disinformation campaigns may well abate as fears of spillover or retaliatory Western cyber responses diminish. **The European Union (EU) must act now, while the intensity of cyber conflict outside Ukraine is still relatively low, to bolster its defenses and prepare for the specter of wide-ranging, damaging cyber operations later in the conflict.**

Cyber and information warfare: The cornerstone of Russia’s next move?

Even if the Russians agree to a truce, cyber and disinformation efforts would be one of the few avenues available to them to inflict damage on Ukraine in the gray zone below the threshold of direct confrontation. As the Russian military shifts its objectives, resources and bandwidth will be freed up to fight from the rear. A cornered Moscow–with few other options left on the table–is likely to resort to the cyber domain, as other pariah states have done, as the ideal vector to circumvent isolation, spy on and disrupt Western defense plans, steal technology and intellectual property it will be cut off from, and heighten its global nuisance with disinformation operations. Recent attacks on a major Ukrainian telecommunications firm, Ukrtelecom, have heightened fears that Russia’s stalling military campaign could cause it to turn to cyber operations as another means of achieving its aims.

What should the European Union do in the immediate term?

The EU has adopted new frameworks, including its much vaunted Strategic Compass, which, in the long term, will improve cybersecurity in the bloc, and potentially reduce the risk of catastrophic Russian cyberattacks. **However, the EU needs to take more steps in the short term to shore up cyber defenses and mitigate the threat of Russian cyber operations.**

First, the EU should get its own house in order. The revised Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive–better known in Brussels circles as NIS 2–should be finalized in the coming months and will aim to further strengthen the security of supply chains, streamline incident reporting obligations, and introduce more stringent supervisory measures for a large number of operators of essential services and enterprises across the EU. While NIS 2 represents a step in the right direction, the EU still has some way to go in implementing harmonized cybersecurity rules across the bloc’s own institutions.

Second, the EU and its Member States have a role to play in discouraging and deterring cyberattacks by demonstrating a willingness to act and impose costs on perpetrators. The first-ever operational deployment of the EU’s Cyber Rapid Response Team to Ukraine, alongside similar teams from the United States, was a welcome signal in this respect. One way to impose further costs would be by pushing for coordinated attribution of cyberattacks at the EU-level**. On the offensive and deterrent side, the EU should adopt a pooling of capabilities on a voluntary basis.** Similar programs already exist among other groups, such as NATO’s Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA) program, which the EU could use as a model for its own programs.

Third, the EU should ensure it is better prepared by leveraging the tools it already has at its disposal. Intelligence sharing and situational awareness have proven vital before and during the war in Ukraine, but the future effectiveness of these strategies in deterring and mitigating cyberattacks will be reliant on Member States willingness to contribute with timely and actionable intelligence. In the short term, the Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (CyCLONe), a recently created group bringing together the executives of the EU’s twenty seven national cybersecurity authorities, should be used to its full capability and integrated with the rest of the EU cyber ecosystem. CyCLONe, with their wealth of operational-level expertise, should be able to brief political decision-makers in the Council more frequently. On the military side, the EU still lacks a fully fleshed-out cooperation mechanism for military cybersecurity alerts, despite this being an objective since the 2014 EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. Ensuring cooperation among both civilian and military groups is vital given the specter of Russian cyberattacks.

Supporting Ukraine is every democracy’s duty. Russia will attempt to undermine this support through cyberattacks and other means. The EU needs to shore up its cyber defenses at home to ensure all Members can continue to aid Ukraine in the future.

## US-EU Coop CP

### US-EU Coop Key to Solve

#### U.S. – EU cooperation effectively counters disinformation

Ignatidou, Chatham House International Security DepartmentAcademy Stavros Niarchos Foundation Fellow, 19

[Sophia, 9-19, Chatham House, " EU–US Cooperation on Tackling Disinformation", https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-10-03-EU-US-TacklingDisinformation.pdf, p 35, Accessed 7-6-22, LASA-LR]

It is only through an effective US and EU collaboration on the issue of regulatory reform and disinformation countermeasures that we can set meaningful baseline norms, avoid a regulatory patchwork, duplication of efforts and overcome jurisdiction conflicts. The US and the EU should also lead the effort of convergence in terms of data protection. Security and privacy are intertwined.

While in the EU data-driven disinformation campaigns have ignited debates about data governance, the US is slowly but surely joining in. Data is crucial in campaigning. According to Brendan Fischer, director of federal reform at Campaign Legal Center in the US, ‘you have organizations that are supposed to be operating independently of candidates, sharing data with candidates which in many ways is more valuable than giving them money’.172

The two sides of the Atlantic do not share perfectly aligned positions on notions of privacy,173 but the EU’s GDPR displays normative power, with legal experts and policymakers in the US considering its merits. Nevertheless, establishing a balance between meaningful and comprehensive data subject rights on one hand, with a public and private surveillance infrastructure seen as vital to national security, will be extremely challenging.

## Canada CP

### Canada CP – 1NC

#### The Government of Canada should increase its security cooperation with NATO ….

Maddock-Ferrie, Officer Cadet, Royal Military College of Canada, 22

[Blair Maddock, 5-2-2022, Royal Military College of Canada, "View of A Policy Proposal for Canadian the Government to Counter Disinformation,", https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/fede/article/view/15368/10193, Accessed 7-7-2022, LASA-LR]

This paper recommends that a hybrid model of education and retaliation be adopted to slow the spread of disinformation. Canada needs to adopt a policy in line with NATO that could provide the time for the creation a long-term approach in the form of education. While retaliation will buy time, the existing monitoring apparatus coupled with working with allies to implement a widespread education initiative could achieve lasting positive results.61

Other nations are under threat from disinformation; NATO has offered to work with Canada to develop a database that could be shared across the alliance.62Not only would sharing the database dramatically decrease the individual cost burden, but it would also provide exceptionally more data points to identify what disinformation is.63Any algorithm is only as accurate as the data input within; therefore, the data input rate is directly correlated to the accuracy of a properly trained AI.64Further, the use of allied powers would help regain public trust as it would legitimize Canadian actions in the larger context.65Ultimately, Canada needs a cohesive strategy that uses existing infrastructure where possible and allied help when offered to win against this increasingly widespread foe. Further, given NATO has sanctioned Russia for offensive military actions in the Ukraine. It is reasonable that using various sanctions as a form non-kinetic retaliation is a strategy that is in line with NATO’s existing precedent against Russia.

### Canada CP - Middle Power Leadership NB

#### Now key time for Canadian middle power leadership within multinational institutions

Rashchupkina, Faculty, Political Science and School of Climate Change and Adaptation, University of Prince Edward Island, 22 (Yuliya, “Canadian foreign politics: is there any chance of making headway in preserving the liberal international order?”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, DOI: 10.1080/11926422.2022.2033286

The US has signaled a retreat from its efforts aimed at promoting nation-building and pro- tecting human rights and democracy worldwide, while China has yet to demonstrate any commitment to embracing the human rights and democracy aspects of the liberal inter- national order (LIO). These developments and the great power competition between the US and China undermine the LIO, so, reaffirmed commitments to multilateralism are needed (Emmers, 2018). The middle power states are believed to at least slow the disin- tegration of LIO if not halt its deterioration altogether (Paris, 2019).

The rise of China, its approach to international politics, and the US-China competition over establishing and maintaining international rules pose a challenge to Canada, along with other middle power states. Canada faces a choice to either take a hardline approach to China, risking economic losses to the Canadian economy, or to continue a policy of engagement, thus potentially increasing the risks of heavy dependence on China and further legitimizing China's antidemocratic leadership internationally. Significant confron- tational measures around trade and investments toward China could harm the Canadian exporting industries of wood pulp, vehicles, fish, mineral fuels, fertilizers and food. In the past, the Canadian government decided not to retaliate when, after Ms. Meng's arrest, China imposed a de facto ban on imports of Canadian canola, pork, beef and soya. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Canada initiated the adoption of the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations; however, while the document condemns governments-sponsored arbitrary detentions, it does not imply any economic sanctions for this behavior. Trudeau's government has not formally banned Huawei from its 5G net- works even though the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, the other four members of the Five Eyes intelligence network, have done so.

In this contribution, the author argues that Canada, a middle power state and tra- ditional ally of the US, cannot afford to unilaterally take coercive measures against China in the realm of protecting human rights and democracy; it is too dependent on trade, investment and science-related collaboration with China. Canada can, however, promote a less unilateralist, more globalist attitude toward international politics. It can play a more active role in improving the work of the existing multilateral institutions and emerging partnerships, while also contributing to shifting the US's foreign policy pri- orities toward more collaborative solutions and approaches in international affairs.

#### Global peace and stability

Rashchupkina, Faculty, Political Science and School of Climate Change and Adaptation, University of Prince Edward Island, 22 (Yuliya, “Canadian foreign politics: is there any chance of making headway in preserving the liberal international order?”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, DOI: 10.1080/11926422.2022.2033286

Middle power states in the international arena generally have "an ability to keep a dis- tance from major conflicts, a degree of autonomy from the major powers, a dedication to international stability, and a commitment to gradual world change" (as cited in Wood, 1988). These features help middle power countries like Canada to advance international cooperation and find peaceful solutions to conflicts. Since the end of World War II, Canadian representatives have played an important role in promoting and upholding the values and principles of human rights, free trade, democracy, and international peace and stability. The Canadian leadership was instrumental in the Ottawa Process to ban landmines, in the development and international recog- nition of the Responsibility to Protect, in the Kimberley Process to ban conflict dia- monds, in the creation of the International Criminal Court, and in the introduction of the concept of human security.

### Canada CP – Solvency Extension - Disinformation

Maddock-Ferrie, Officer Cadet, Royal Military College of Canada, 22

(Blair, “A Policy Proposal for Canadian the Government to Counter Disinformation: Countering Disinformation Through Collaboration”, FEDERALISM-E, Volume 23, <https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/fede/article/view/15368>, GDI, accessed 7/5/22)

Education could also be achieved by maintaining a database of disinformation, as well as forcing government employees to complete courses that address disinformation.35 The goal of the database would first and foremost be to prevent the government from spreading disinformation accidentally; and secondly, to offer educational tools to the public.36 The creation of a database is recommended by NATO and also supported by the Global Engagement Center, with the goal of keeping this database open to the public and allied governments.37 The creation of this data base is at this time theoretically but likely on going through American and Estonian efforts.38 The risk is that these tools will not stand up to opposing actor adaptation because several reports indicate that the Russian and Chinese governments already understand how nations react to disinformation much better than the experts who write the policies in western nations.39 Thus, a publicly available database would maximize the value of education, while at the same time prevents government entities from spreading opposing actor disinformation unintentionally.40 There are many instances of Russian and Chinese disinformation being spread by government agencies located in Canada and the United States showing the importance of educating all levels of Canadian and American government.41

NATO has been experimenting with how to inflict a cost to opposing actor operations, and from such activities what emerged were two competing theories. First, fight disinformation with disinformation, and the second theory suggests using asset forfeiture of these sites where possible, targeting websites and generators of large-scale conspiracies. In the 1950-60s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted the first option; it had little success with this operation, having backfired on the US, as the operation was perceived by American allies as having undermined the faith in the US. This may have inadvertently contributed to false intelligence assessments both within the US and in allied nations.42 However, humours forms of countering disinformation through memes, that directly addresses Russian disinformation has been successful. The invasion of Ukraine has seen widespread use of memes intended to challenge Russian disinformation. These memes have seen great success in undermining the effectiveness and reach of Russian disinformation operations. The cost effectiveness of this meme tactic makes it ideal for nations with small military budgets to adopt as a form of retaliation.43 The second option involved the use of attacking the major sources of disinformation by identifying its country of origin and sites that host it. Many disinformation websites propagate old articles and/or participate in disinformation networks, such as botnets which automatically promote false articles. These article are often copied or slightly modified from original creator that is at the center of the bot net and is the human actor44 By identifying the first website to post articles containing disinformation, one can trace the origin of the disinformation and, in turn, target the websites, their financial links, and where they are based.45 Over time and through the use of shared intelligence networks, the process can be automated effectively. This would not censor the disinformation directly, as it targets the source of the disinformation.46 This would not prevent or limit the spread of user-generated content either.

### Canada CP – Solves Democracy

Maddock-Ferrie, Officer Cadet, Royal Military College of Canada, 22

(Blair, “A Policy Proposal for Canadian the Government to Counter Disinformation: Countering Disinformation Through Collaboration”, FEDERALISM-E, Volume 23, <https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/fede/article/view/15368>, GDI, accessed 7/5/22)

The Canadian government has already acknowledged two competing schools of thought that favour domestic and international responses, the issues comes when these are mechanized on the domestic level. Broadly, under domestic modes of control or international initiatives. However, there exists a third path that employs the mechanisms of domestic modes of control in a manner that does not harm free speech. This option affords government the ability to monitor a particular population through existing frameworks, and using algorithms coupled with data contributed by allied nations that identified disinformation. Bill C-ll, which forces social media companies to provide data analyses for all users, further expands the possible usages of algorithms and other data analyses.34 This serves three purposes: first, to understand the size of the threat; second, to analyze threat viability, including funding and possible weaknesses within tactics and third, to identify which groups consume the most disinformation as a possible indicator of the groups that are dissatisfied.

### Canada CP – Solves Liberal International Order

#### Canada can reinforce democratic liberal world order

Rashchupkina, Faculty, Political Science and School of Climate Change and Adaptation, University of Prince Edward Island, 22 (Yuliya, “Canadian foreign politics: is there any chance of making headway in preserving the liberal international order?”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, DOI: 10.1080/11926422.2022.2033286

Heightened tensions with China, however, may push the Canadian government to redirect some of its budget priorities toward increased contributions to its military forces and greater financial assistance to strengthen NATO. As one of the founding members of NATO, Canada might also need to intervene to reduce internal contradictions within the union. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey appear to have developed strong ties with China, thus diminishing the chances of offering the US unwa- vering support should military conflicts escalate (Mounk, 2021).

Canada could challenge China's assertive efforts in Southeast Asia through providing aid to regional development through the Asian Development Bank or Asian Infrastruc- ture Investment Bank (AIIB) or by engaging in efforts toward the diversification of global supply chains. These efforts would not involve an open confrontation with China, but they could help the states in the Indo-Pacific region to be more resilient in the face of China's more assertive actions toward Taiwan in the South China and East China seas.

Canada could also play its role in reinforcing the ILO by shifting the "democratic club" countries' priorities toward cooperative actions around the issues of the environment, climate change, public health, trade liberalization and peacekeeping operations. For example, Canada can do its part for international climate change policies by setting a good example for other heavy carbon polluting countries such as the US, China and Aus- tralia to commit to concrete measures in reducing reliance on fossil fuels and providing financing for developing countries - the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. After the US rejoined the Paris Agreement, China expressed its willing- ness to work together on climate issues. However, the current shortage of energy sources in China, geopolitical and trade-related tensions with the US, and prioritizing economic growth amidst the global pandemic might stall progress on cutting green- house gas emissions.

The issues of global concern will not be solved without the meaningful involvement of countries with illiberal political regimes, which warrants scholars' and international policy- makers' engagement with the question of what the current priorities of the LIO are and how critical the democratic components of it are for the stable future of the world.

## NATO Secretary General CP

#### NATO Secretary General should encourage member state cyber resiliency

Rebegea, Center for European Policy Analysis Democratic Resilience Director & Schmiedl, Center for European Policy Analysis Senior Program Officer, 21

[Corina & Carsten, In 2020, Schmiedl served as Advisor to the U.S. representative and co-chair of the NATO Reflection Group, 2022, NATO 2030 Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, “Chapter 13 War by Other Means: Securing NATO Against Disinformation in the Coming Decade”, edited by Jason Blessing, Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, “Chapter 13 War by Other Means: Securing NATO Against Disinformation in the Coming Decade”, <https://www.sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/nato-2030-towards-new-strategic-concept-and-beyond>, p. 305-6, accessed 6-22-22, AFB]

Strengthen democratic resilience within NATO.

Threats to transatlantic security come from outside the Alliance, but also from within. Disinformation thrives in weakened democracies where polarization, corruption, weak independent media, and low social cohesion and trust invite foreign authoritarian influence. Just as NATO played a key role in the 1990s and early 2000s in getting Central and Eastern European countries on a stable democratic course, Article 2—which calls for strengthening democratic institutions—should be brought back to the forefront of political deliberations within the Alliance.

NATO’s continued support and cooperation with free and independent media is essential to strengthening resilience. Secretary General Stoltenberg has stated that “the best response to disinformation and propaganda is the free and independent press...when they ask difficult questions, then disinformation and propaganda will never succeed.”89 NATO should therefore encourage journalist exchanges, facilitate media access to activities and exercises, and urge member states to invest in a more robust independent local media presence.

The new Strategic Concept offers an opportunity to establish more baseline consensus on resilience. The Secretary General has often appealed to the values on which the Alliance was founded and should continue to use the clout of his position to advance the conversation inside the North Atlantic Council on how democratic resilience contributes to Allied security.90 The 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué highlights the importance of the fight against corruption and good governance for fulfilling the Alliance’s mission. A monitoring mechanism inside the Alliance or even sanctioning members91 will not meet consensus. The Secretary General should work discreetly behind closed doors with member states when gaps are identified. Adopting a code of conduct (as per the recommendations of the NATO 2030 Reflection Group) and working with the EU on a system of incentives and disincentives would also enhance security and trust and consolidate political support.92 NATO is ultimately a community of norms and derives its resilience to disinformation and influence operations from the political cohesion of its members.

## Domestic Action CP

#### The USFG should invest in solutions that shore up trust domestically

**Lim, Harvard Kennedy School's Shorenstein Center Technology and Social Change Research Project Researcher, 20**

(Gabrielle, 8-7-2020, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation ", https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation/, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

Mass-targeted covert influence operations and disinformation campaigns are real. Analysis from studies show that they promote narratives that aim to provoke outrage, capitalize on social cleavages and, in some cases, push narratives in the interest of certain countries. However, evidence of activity is not evidence of impact. To be sure, we should be aware of such operations, bringing them to light and, when appropriate, removing them. However, if the free flow of ideas, freedom of expression and a better quality of democratic participation are the ultimate goals, relying on detection and deletion is not enough, and, as outlined above, the exaggeration of the threat of foreign influence operations may do more harm than good. **Instead, we should invest in solutions that shore up trust and increase political participation, civil discourse and pluralism.**

**As a first step, the US Foreign Agents Registration Act, which risks being abused for political reasons, should be reformed**, as Nick Robinson argues in Foreign Policy. Second, increasing transparency around campaign funding and online ad spending would also be helpful, specifically around “dark money” — where the identities of the donors are concealed. And lastly, states need to do the hard work of governance. **In many ways the prevalence of false and misleading content is symptomatic of deeper issues**. As Johan Farkas and Jannick Schou demonstrate in their book, Post-Truth, Fake News and Democracy, the decline in democracy has been ongoing for decades and is not because of social media: “There is a series of deep-seated problems facing liberal democracies, but the rise of fake news and alternative facts is not the biggest of our problems.” **Instead of looking overseas for scapegoats, we should be looking at why trust in our own institutions and authorities has fallen, why civil discourse has devolved and how to better address the many social divisions that drive our receptivity for dubious content.**

#### To combat disinformation NATO should propose a standard of classes that teach media literacy. This solves all of aff’s impacts and stops political apathy

**Seib, USC Annenberg School for Communication and Public Diplomacy Professor Emeritus, 22**

(Philip, 5-9-2022, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, "Why Russia Is Losing the Information War", https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/why-russia-losing-information-war/, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

Ukraine itself is doing a remarkable job of presenting its story to the world. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is ubiquitous. Whether he is walking through Kyiv or addressing the United Nations, Zelenskyy forcefully calls upon the world to assist his country. He has become a media superstar, admired as the Ukrainian David standing up to the Russian Goliath. Besides Zelenskyy, Ukrainian officials and individual citizens flood social media with words and images about their resistance to the invader. This content is often heartbreaking, as it vividly illustrates the human costs of war, but for now it keeps Ukraine at the forefront of debate about the geopolitical future.

In response, the Kremlin relies on connecting with presumably sympathetic Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine and elsewhere. It also broadcasts anti-American messaging about Ukraine to parts of the world where suspicion of the United States runs high. But in the contest for Western public opinion, Russia is finding itself overmatched.

Nevertheless, as war drags on, terrain changes. Vladimir Putin will try to outlast his opponents, knowing that the public’s attention span is notoriously short, no matter how horrific daily news reports might be. Zelenskyy and his compatriots must continue to counterpunch fiercely with information as well as conventional military measures.

**Beyond Ukraine, information warfare will be a significant factor in future conflicts**. Among lessons learned from this war should be that an unprepared public is dangerously susceptible to disinformation. Manipulated communication expands during conflict. In response, global publics will need to embrace media literacy, which fosters healthy skepticism as people weigh the information they receive. This means adding media literacy training across education systems’ curricula. **Some nations, notably Finland, are already doing this, but most countries lag far behind.**

The classroom may seem a long way from the battleground of Ukraine, but understanding and mastering the use of information at war is a complex task. Vladimir Putin is painfully learning that.